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Abstract 
The vast majority of cases heard and determined by the Federal Court of 
Canada relate to immigration law; approximately 80% of the cases 
adjudicated by the Federal Court of Canada are immigration matters.1  Most 
immigration cases that reach the Federal Court of Canada eventually result 
in the individual’s removal.  A motion for a stay of removal is generally the 
last recourse a person can seek in order to avoid or, at least, delay his or her 
removal from Canada.  Nearly 800 such motions were adjudicated by the 
Federal Court of Canada in 2008.2  Despite such a considerable number of 
cases and the important role these proceedings play in a person’s life, no 
author has ever attempted to organize and present the legislative and 
jurisprudential rules that govern stays.  No books, articles or commentaries 
have been written to analyze the cases rendered on motions for a stay of 
removal.  No document compiling decisions relating to stay of removal has 
ever been prepared.  Similarly, universities and other institutions do not offer 
courses or professional development training on this subject. The law 
relating to stays consists exclusively of cases decided by the Federal Court. A 
lawyer is expected to prepare a stay motion almost intuitively.  Yet, the 
urgent nature of these proceedings makes it practically impossible for 
inexperienced counsel to conduct adequate research and properly represent 
the interests of their client.  Hence, many strong cases are lost due to a lack 
of experience and inadequate preparation.  Many excellent lawyers 
practicing immigration law refuse to introduce such proceedings before the 
Federal Courts because they are not familiar with the principles governing 
stays. The law of stays in an immigration context resembles a legal 
patchwork because the case law is often inconsistent and at times 
contradictory.  The main objective of this paper is to organize, present, and 
explain, in a clear and concise manner, the law of stays.  In particular, this 
paper examines the three types of stays: legislative, administrative and 
judicial. The author is convinced that judges and practitioners alike will find 
this quick reference tool very useful when dealing with motions for a stay of 
removal. 
 
Key words: stay, removal, deportation, immigration, injunction, PRRA, 
Federal Court, litigation, Toth 
 
                                            
1 Canada, Federal Court, Statistics: Activity Summary – January 1 to December 31, 
2000-2008. 
2 Canada, Department of Justice Canada, Statistics: Stay Motions, January 1 to 
December 31, 2008. 
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Résumé 
La grande majorité des causes tranchées par la Cour fédérale relève du droit 
de l’immigration. Environ 80% des causes plaidées devant la Cour fédérale 
sont en matière d’immigration. La plupart des causes qui se rendent à la 
Cour fédérale aboutissent au renvoi de la personne concernée.  La requête en 
sursis est généralement le dernier recours que la personne peut exercer afin 
d’éviter ou à tout le moins retarder son renvoi du Canada. Près de 800 de ces 
requêtes en sursis ont été décidées par la Cour fédérale en 2008.  Malgré un 
si grand nombre de causes et malgré le rôle important que ces requêtes 
peuvent jouer dans la vie d’une personne, aucun auteur n’a organisé et 
présenté les règles législatives et jurisprudentielles qui s’appliquent à ces 
procédures.  Aucun livre, article ou commentaire n’a été rédigé sur ce sujet. 
De même, il n’existe aucun cours d’université ni de formations 
professionnelles sur les requêtes en sursis.  Le droit des sursis consiste 
exclusivement de la jurisprudence des cours fédérales.  Ainsi, on s’attend à 
ce qu’un avocat prépare une requête en sursis intuitivement.  Toutefois, à 
cause de la nature urgente de cette procédure, il est pratiquement impossible 
pour un avocat inexpérimenté de se préparer adéquatement et de bien 
représenter les intérêts de son client. Beaucoup de causes ayant un fort 
potentiel sont perdues par manque d’expérience de l’avocat ou à cause d’une 
préparation inadéquate.   La jurisprudence émanant de la Cour fédérale 
relativement aux sursis semble être incohérente et parfois même 
contradictoire.  L’objectif  principal de cet article est d’organiser, de 
présenter et d’expliquer de façon claire et concise le droit des sursis.  Plus 
particulièrement, nous examinerons en détail les trois types de sursis – les 
sursis législatifs, administratifs et judiciaires.  L’auteur est certain que tant 
les juges que les plaideurs trouveront cet ouvrage de référence utile dans la 
préparation et l’adjudication des causes. 
 
Mots-clés : Sursis, renvoi, déportation, immigration, injonction, Toth, ÉRAR, 
Cour fédérale, litige 
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STATUTORY, JUDICIAL, AND ADMINISTRATIVE STAYS IN 
IMMIGRATION MATTERS 
INTRODUCTION 
 This paper explores the concept of stays in immigration law.  Three 
types of stays can be encountered in the Canadian immigration law practice: 
statutory, administrative and judicial.   
 Statutory stays originate from the Act or the Regulations.  
Administrative stays are granted by the Minister or his representatives. 
Judicial stays are granted by the Courts.   
 A judicial stay is an interim relief against a federal board, agency, 
tribunal or any other federal decision-making body.  It is similar to an 
interlocutory injunction, subject to the same tripartite test.3  This tripartite 
test in immigration matters is now commonly referred to as the Toth test 
based on the leading case in respect of stays.4  Put differently, a judicial stay 
is a decree in equity demanding that the immigration authorities refrain from 
executing or enforcing a given order.  Most stay applications are sought to 
prevent the imminent removal of a foreign national from Canada.  In such 
cases, unless there is a statutory stay of a removal order specified under the 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act5 (IRPA) or under the Immigration 
and Refugee Protection Regulations6 (IRPR), the person who is on the verge 
of being removed must apply and obtain a stay of a removal order from the 
                                            
3 Manitoba (A.G.) v. Metropolitan Stores Ltd., [1987] 1 S.C.R. 110, 38 D.L.R. (4th) 
321, [1987] 3 W.W.R. 1, 25 Admin. L.R. 20 (S.C.C.) [Metropolitan Stores] 
(principles to be used when deciding to grant stay being: assessment of a serious 
issue on the merits of the case, assessment of whether irreparable harm will be 
suffered and assessment of balance of inconveniences). 
4 Toth v. Canada (M.E.I.) (1988), 6 Imm. L.R. (2d) 123, 86 N.R. 302 (F.C.A.) 
[Toth]. 
5 R.S.C. 2001, c. 27. 
6 SOR/2002-227. 
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Federal Court.7  Hence, a motion for a stay of removal is generally the last 
recourse a foreign national can seek in order to avoid, or at least delay, his or 
her removal from Canada.  Such a motion may give rise only to an order 
temporarily staying the foreign national’s removal.  The foreign national 
likely to rely on this proceeding would be either an unsuccessful refugee 
claimant who has exhausted the administrative recourses in Canada, a 
permanent resident stripped of his or her permanent status, or a temporary 
resident against whom a removal order became enforceable. 
 Since stay motions are mostly sought by foreign nationals who are in 
imminent danger of deportation, the federal departments responsible for 
immigration and border control8 are the responding parties before the Federal 
Court.   Occasionally, the roles may be reversed; it may happen that the 
Crown is the moving party and the foreign national is the responding party.  
The Crown often files a motion for a stay of proceedings seeking an interim 
order against an independent administrative board.9  In cases where the 
Crown is the moving party, it generally seeks to prevent the release from 
custody of a person considered a danger to Canadians or who poses a flight 
risk.10  A foreign national detained by the Canadian immigration authorities is 
                                            
7 Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7, s. 18.2 (allowing the Trial Division of the 
Federal Court to make such interim orders as it considers appropriate pending final 
disposition of application). 
8 Pursuant to section 4(2) of IRPA, the Minister of Public Safety is responsible for 
examinations at ports of entry, arrests, detentions, removals, determinations relating 
to inadmissibility on grounds of security, organized criminality or violating human 
or international rights.  Conversely, section 4(1) of IRPA states that the Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration is responsible for the administration of the Act with 
respect to all other issues. 
9 See e.g. Canada (M.C.I.) v. Ambrose, 2003 FCT 203, 228 F.T.R. 123 (T.D.) 
[Ambrose]; Canada (M.P.S.E.P.) v. Ouerk, 2008 FC 167 (T.D.) [Ouerk]; Canada 
(M.P.S.E.P.) v. Iamkhong, 2009 FC 52 (T.D.) [Iamkhong]. 
10 But see Canada v. Canadian Council for Refugees, 2008 FCA 40 (F.C.A.) [Safe 
Third-1] where the Crown sought from the Federal Court of Appeal an Order 
staying the Judgment of the Trial Division which declared invalid the Agreement 
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entitled to detention review hearings.11  During these detention review 
hearings, the Immigration Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board – 
an independent administrative board – is required to determine whether the 
detention should be maintained.12  When the Board decides to order the 
person’s release, the Minister of Public Safety might challenge this decision 
before the Federal Court by way of judicial review.  However, the release 
order is effective immediately;13 therefore, by the time the judicial review 
application is disposed of, the points in issue will become moot.  To prevent 
the foreign national’s release from detention before the disposition of the 
Judicial Review, the Crown (the Minister of Public Safety) will seek from the 
Federal Court an order requesting that the individual’s release be stayed 
pending the final disposition of the judicial review application. 
 A stay of proceedings is generally requested or granted pending the 
disposition of the main or of the underlying application.  Therefore, it is an 
accessory to another application – commonly known as the underlying 
application – and cannot exist without a principal or an underlying 
application.14  For instance, a stay of removal may be requested pending the 
                                                                                                                            
Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of 
America for Cooperation in the Examination of Refugee Status Claims from 
Nationals of Third Countries, also known as the Safe Third Country Agreement 
(STCA) between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United 
States of America (U.S.) in Canadian Council for Refugees v. Canada, 2007 FC 
1262, 164 C.R.R. (2d) 130, 74 Admin. L.R. (4th) 176, 317 F.T.R. 246 (T.D.), rev’d 
2008 FCA 229, 74 Admin. L.R. (4th) 79 (F.C.A.) [Safe Third-2]. 
11 Section 57 of IRPA obliges the Immigration Division to review the reasons for 
the continued detention of a permanent resident or a foreign national once within 48 
hours after he or she is taken into detention, once during the seven days following 
the first detention review, and at least once during each 30-day period following 
each previous review. 
12 This determination is made in light of the factors enumerated under section 58 of 
IRPA. 
13 Immigration Division Rules, SOR/2002-229, r. 11(3). 
14 See e.g. Alaa v. Canada (M.P.S.E.P.), 2006 FC 14 at paras. 9-13 (T.D.) [Alaa]. 
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disposition of a judicial review hearing, in which case a litigant or a party is 
asking the Court to stay or to delay his or her removal until it hears the case 
(i.e. the judicial review application) on its merits.  In an immigration context, 
the underlying application is most of the time, if not always, an application 
for judicial review or an application for leave and for judicial review as 
described in subsection 72(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.  
 The Federal Court of Canada adjudicated nearly 800 stay motions in 
immigration matters in 2008.15  In the same year, over 5600 immigration-
related proceedings were commenced.16  This is to say that in 2008, parties 
filed a stay motion in one out of seven cases.  The significance of the number 
of stays filed becomes clear when we contrast it with the total number of non-
immigration proceedings commenced before the Federal Court.  
Approximately 1600 proceedings were commenced in the Federal Court, in 
cases that relate to matters other than immigration, including aboriginal law, 
intellectual property, admiralty, crown responsibility and so on.17  Stays in 
immigration matters alone amount to 50% of these non-immigration 
proceedings. Yet, despite such a considerable number of stay applications and 
the important role these proceedings may play in a person’s life, no author 
has ever attempted to organize and present the legislative and jurisprudential 
rules that govern them. Indeed, no books, articles or commentaries have ever 
been written to analyze and organize the law on stays.  No document 
compiling decisions relating to stays has ever been prepared.  Similarly, 
universities and other institutions do not offer courses or professional 
development training on this subject.  
                                            
15 Canada, Department of Justice, Statistics: Stay Motions, January 1 to December 
31, 2008. 
16 Canada, Federal Courts, Statistics: Activity Summary – January 1 to December 
31, 2008. 
17 Ibid.  
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 Litigators are expected to prepare a stay motion almost intuitively.  
However, stay motions are complex proceedings and require an in-depth 
knowledge of administrative law, immigration law and federal court 
procedure.  In addition to these competencies, counsel must also be familiar 
with the jurisprudence or the case law that specifically applies to stays in 
immigration matters.  Furthermore, the urgent nature of these proceedings 
makes it practically impossible for inexperienced counsel to conduct adequate 
research and properly represent the interests of their clients. Applicants 
almost never have more than two weeks, and at times they have as little as 24 
hours, to prepare a motion record in support of their request for a stay of their 
removal.18  Respondents almost never get more than 48 hours to respond to 
such a motion19 and often have only a few hours to prepare their motion 
record. Needless to say, neither party has sufficient time to conduct 
exhaustive research and identify every argument that can be raised in support 
of their position.  Yet both parties are expected to produce a sound factual 
and legal basis for their claims. 
 As litigation counsel for the federal Department of Justice, the author 
has witnessed many strong cases fail as a result of inexperience and 
inadequate preparation of counsel.  In many cases, all of the elements 
required to succeed were present; nonetheless, a large proportion of these 
                                            
18 As a rule, immigration authorities give at least a two-week notice to foreign 
nationals being removed except when they are detained, in which case the notice 
may be given 48 hours prior to the removal date.  What is more, in cases where the 
moving party is the Crown, and the underlying application challenges a release 
order rendered by the Immigration Division during a detention review, Crown 
counsel often have less than 24 hours to prepare the motion record. 
19 Federal Courts Rules, SOR/98-106, r. 364(3), 365 (the applicant shall serve and 
file his motion record at least two days before the day set out in the notice of 
motion for the hearing of the motion whereas the respondent to this motion shall 
serve and file his motion record not later than 2:00 p.m. on the last business day 
before the hearing of the motion.  In practice, these rules give 48 hours to the 
Respondent to prepare his Motion Record). 
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cases did not succeed because counsel arguing them failed to raise arguments 
that could have been decisive.   
 The complexity of the law of stays is exacerbated by the fact that this 
field of law resembles a legal patchwork: the case law is often inconsistent 
and even contradictory.  Judges of the Federal Court have very little time to 
consider the facts and the legal arguments put forth by both parties; they are 
required to reach extremely important decisions within a few hours or at best 
within a few days. Hence, much depends on the values of the judge hearing 
the matter as well as on the particular facts of the case.  Nevertheless, neither 
the urgent nature of these proceedings, the specific facts of a case, nor the 
values of the judge presiding the hearing make for an acceptable explanation 
or valid reason for the discrepancies that exist in the law relating to stays. 
 The main objective of this paper is to organize, present, and explain, 
in a clear and concise manner, the nature of various types of stays, their 
genesis, the case law that is applicable to them and the manner in which a 
motion for stay should be prepared, filed and argued.  The author genuinely 
hopes that this paper will help create some consistency and coherence in the 
jurisprudence relating to stays.  It will also allow counsel acting for both 
sides to represent more adequately the interests of their clients.  The author is 
confident that judges and practitioners will find this quick reference tool very 
useful when dealing with motions for a stay of removal because they will find 
here readily applicable arguments and principles.  
 This paper is divided into two parts.  The first part deals with 
statutory and administrative stays.  Statutory stays, described in the first 
section of part one, are stays of removal that result from the operation of law, 
whereas administrative stays, described in the second section of part one, are 
those granted by the immigration authorities.   
 With regard to statutory stays, we will explain the circumstances 
which give rise to them under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 
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and its Regulations.  We will also explain the case law which interpreted 
different provisions of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and its 
Regulations as they pertain to statutory stays.  The section on statutory stays 
provides the reader with text of the provision granting the statutory stay, and 
then further furnishes it with critical commentary and explanatory notes.   
 As regards the administrative stays, we will examine the duties of the 
decision-makers entrusted with the discretionary power of granting stays.  
These decision-makers are commonly known as removals officers or 
enforcement officers.  These officials are often the last individuals a deportee 
will ever see in Canada because theirs is the responsibility of ensuring that a 
subject of an enforceable removal order is removed from Canada.  In other 
words, these are the individuals in charge of the person’s removal.  We will 
briefly examine their role and the scope of their discretionary power.   
 The second part is the core of this paper, as it focuses on judicial 
stays – stays that are granted by the courts.  In this part, we shall consider the 
history and nature of judicial stays.  We will examine the origins and the 
equitable nature of this remedy.  We will briefly consider the practical 
implications that the equitable nature of stays may have in litigation.  We will 
discuss the jurisdiction of the federal and provincial courts.  In particular, we 
will analyze the circumstances which grant the required jurisdiction to hear 
motions for a stay of removal to provincial courts. In the same section, we 
will also examine the conditions of the tri-partite test that an applicant is 
required to meet in order to obtain this remedy from the courts.  It is to be 
observed that in order to succeed, the moving party needs to establish that he 
raised a serious issue, that he will suffer irreparable harm if the remedy is not 
granted and that the balance of inconveniences favors him. However, these 
three factors have a peculiar meaning in immigration matters.  We will lay 
bare the meaning of the terms serious issue, irreparable harm, and the balance 
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of inconveniences.  This section will also include an examination of the 
procedure that practitioners should follow when filing a stay motion.   
 Moreover, we will consider the most common arguments raised by 
moving parties when the underlying application challenges a refusal to grant 
permanent residence on humanitarian and compassionate grounds, when it 
challenges the rejection of a pre-removal risk assessment application or when 
it challenges a refusal to defer the applicant’s removal.  Similarly, we will 
examine the arguments that the Crown is likely to raise when seeking an 
order staying the release of a detained foreign national. 
PROLIGOMENON 
 Before disserting on the subject of stays, it is worthwhile explaining 
when and how a person reaches the stage of his removal and would be 
contemplating filing a stay of removal.  To understand the concept of 
removals, one must grasp the meaning of the terms “removal order”, 
“removal order that came into force” and “enforceable removal order”. 
 A removal order is not a term that is defined either in the 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act or in its Regulations.  Section 223 of 
the Regulations sets out the three types of removal orders that exist.  These 
are (1) departure orders, (2) exclusion orders and (3) deportation orders.  
 The differences that exist between these removal orders are important 
because due to the enforcement of these removal orders, an individual might 
be required to obtain authorization to return to Canada.  For instance, an 
enforced departure order is the least damaging of them all: it relieves the 
foreign national from having to obtain authorization in order to return to 
Canada.20  The exclusion order, on the other hand, in most circumstances 
obliges the foreign national to obtain written authorization in order to return 
                                            
20 IRPR, supra note 6, s. 234. 
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to Canada for a period of one or two years after its enforcement.21  The most 
damaging of them all is the deportation order, which, pursuant to section 226 
of the Regulations, obliges the foreign national to obtain a written 
authorization to return to Canada at any time after the deportation order is 
enforced. 
 Removal orders may be issued by an officer,22 by a minister’s 
delegate23 or by the Immigration Division of the Immigration and Refugee 
Board.24  They may be subject to three degrees of imminence or intensity.   
 The least imminent type of order is the conditional removal order.  
This removal order may never come into force and it may be cancelled if, for 
instance, the subject of this conditional removal order is found to be a 
Convention refugee or a person in need of protection.  In such cases, the 
removal order would simply fall or be cancelled by operation of law.  A 
conditional removal order is normally made against a refugee protection 
claimant at the port of entry.  As soon as an individual claims asylum in 
Canada, an officer issues a conditional removal order.25  This conditional 
removal order is a departure order, which, as we mentioned earlier, is the 
least draconian type of removal order.  The severity of this order is 
moderated if the individual complies with the removal order and leaves 
voluntarily, in which case he or she will not need a written authorization to 
return to Canada. A conditional removal order may then either fall or come 
into force.  It falls when the person is granted asylum or the status of a person 
                                            
21 Ibid., s. 225. 
22 See e.g. IRPA, supra note 5, s. 49; IRPR, supra note 6, s. 228(3) (for refugee 
protection claimants whose claim has been determined to be eligible to be referred 
to the Refugee Protection Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board). 
23 IRPA, ibid., s. 44(2). 
24 Ibid., s. 45(d). 
25 IRPA, ibid., s. 49(2); IRPR, supra note 6, s. 229(3). 
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in need of protection because the person can no longer be required to leave 
Canada.  The second possible alternative for a conditional removal order is 
that it comes into force when one of the events listed in section 49 of IRPA 
occurs.  A removal order that comes into force but is not yet enforceable 
reaches the second degree of imminence. 
 Essentially, a removal order made with respect to refugee protection 
claimants comes into force when their attempt to obtain a status in Canada 
fails.  All other removal orders come into force on the day they are made if 
there is no right to appeal or on the day of the final determination of the 
appeal, if an appeal is made.26   
 Section 49 of the Act enumerates circumstances when removal orders 
come into force.  This provision consists of two parts.  Subsection 49(2) of 
the Act applies to refugee claimants, as it appears from the wording of the 
provision: “… a removal order made with respect to a refugee protection 
claimant is conditional and comes into force on the latest of the following 
dates…”.  As for subsection 49(1) of the Act, it applies to all other cases, 
including foreign nationals with either temporary or permanent resident 
status. 
 Paragraph 49(1)(a) of the Act states that a removal order comes into 
force on the day it is made, if there is no right to appeal.  Persons most likely 
to fall within the scope of this provision are those who were found to be 
inadmissible on grounds of security,27 violating human or international 
rights,28 serious criminality,29 organized criminality30 or health.31 Once an 
                                            
26 IRPA, ibid., s. 49(1). 
27 Ibid., s. 34. 
28 Ibid., s. 35. 
29 Ibid., s. 36. 
30 Ibid., s. 37.  
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officer forms the opinion that a permanent resident or a foreign national is 
inadmissible on one or more of the grounds enumerated above, he prepares an 
inadmissibility report, which is then transmitted to the Minister or the 
Minister’s delegate.32  If the Minister’s delegate finds the report well-
founded, he or she may, depending on the circumstances of each case, refer 
the report to the Immigration Division for an admissibility hearing or he or 
she may issue a removal order.33  If, instead of making a removal order, the 
Minister’s delegate refers the matter to the Immigration Division, a removal 
order may still be issued by the latter.34  The removal order made by the 
Minister’s delegate or the Immigration Division may be final and without a 
right to appeal if subsection 64(1) of the Act applies to the individual.  
Subsection 64(1) of the Act deprives certain inadmissible individuals from 
their right to appeal; thus, they may be removed as soon as a removal order is 
made against them.35  As stated, a removal order comes into force the day it is 
made if there is no right to appeal.36   
 Conversely, if there is a right to appeal, the removal order comes into 
force the day the appeal period expires and no appeal is made37 or the day of 
                                                                                                                            
31 Ibid., s. 38. 
32 While subsection 44(1) of IRPA states that the report should be transferred to the 
Minister, section 6 of IRPA specifies that the Minister may delegate his powers in 
writing to designated individuals. 
33 IRPA, supra note 5, s. 44(2). 
34 Ibid., s. 45(d) 
35 Ibid., s. 64(1),(2).  See also Martin v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2005 FC 60, 127 C.R.R. 
(2d) 65, 268 F.T.R. 74 (T.D.) [Martin]; Cartwright v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2003 FCT 
792, 236 F.T.R. 98 (T.D.) [Cartwright]; Medovarski v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2004 FCA 
85, 238 D.L.R. (4th) 328, 116 C.R.R. (2d) 268, 248 F.T.R. 319 (F.C.A.) 
[Medovarski], aff’d 2005 SCC 51. 
36 IRPA, supra note 5, s. 49(1)(a). 
37 Ibid., s. 49(1)(b). 
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the final determination of the appeal by the Immigration Appeal Division.38  
The use of the term “final” in the English version of the text under paragraph 
49(1)(c) of the Act may leave the impression that the removal order will not 
come into force until such time as there has been a final determination of any 
application for judicial review filed in a timely fashion challenging the 
Immigration Appeal Division’s decision.39  Such interpretation is inconsistent 
with the French version of the text where the term “décision qui a pour 
résultat le maintien définitif de la mesure” is used instead of the word 
“appel”.  An application for judicial review is not a decision that can 
maintain the removal order; only a decision rendered by the Immigration 
Appeal Division may have such an effect.  
 Subsection 49(2) of the Act applies to asylum claimants. This 
provision sets out circumstances which trigger the coming into force of the 
removal order against refugee protection seekers.  For instance, paragraphs 
49(2)(a) and 101(1)(e) of the Act stipulate that a removal order comes into 
force the day the claim is determined to be ineligible due to the fact that the 
claimant came to Canada from a country designated by the Regulations.  Only 
the United States have been designated by section 159(3) of the Regulations.   
 Two important remarks must be made with respect to the designation 
of the United States.  First, subsection 159(4) of the Regulations specifies 
that a claim will not be ineligible under paragraph 101(1)(e) of the Act, if the 
person coming from the United States seeks to enter Canada at a location that 
is not a port of entry or that is a port of entry which is a harbour port or an 
airport.  In other words, the individual will not be removed immediately 
pursuant to 49(2)(a) of the Act, unless he enters Canada from the United 
States through a terrestrial border. Secondly, the person seeking to enter 
                                            
38 Ibid., s. 49(1)(c) 
39 Lorne Waldman, Canadian Immigration Law and Practice, Loose-leaf ed. 
(Markham: LexisNexis Butterworths, 2008) at 11-131. 
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Canada from the United States must not be an American citizen or a habitual 
resident of the United States pursuant to paragraph 101(1)(e) of the Act. 
 Paragraph 49(2)(b) of the Act is applicable when an immigration 
officer determines that a person’s claim is ineligible to be referred to the 
Refugee Protection Division for one of the reasons enumerated under section 
101 of the Act, except for the reason mentioned under 101(1)(e) of the Act, 
which as we have already seen does not operate a stay of removal.  According 
to paragraph 49(2)(b) of the Act, the removal order made against a person 
who falls within the ambit of section 101 of the Act will come into force 
seven days after the claim is determined to be ineligible.  This seven-day 
delay is provided to allow the person sufficient time to file an application for 
leave to commence an application for judicial review of the ineligibility 
determination with the Federal Court. 
 However, this rule also has an exception.  A stay of seven days will 
not apply if the subject of the removal order resides or sojourns in the United 
States or St. Pierre and Miquelon and is the subject of a report prepared under 
subsection 44(1) of the Act on their entry into Canada, which would normally 
result in an inadmissibility determination.40 
 Paragraphs 49(2)(c),(d), and (e) of the Act provide that a removal 
order comes into force 15 days after the final rejection of the person’s claim 
by the Refugee Protection Division.   
 Finally, the third and the most imminent removal order (or the 
removal order with the greatest degree of imminence) is the enforceable 
removal order.  The subject of this order is in imminent danger of 
deportation.  This is when an individual should seriously consider filing a 
motion for a stay of removal. An enforceable removal order is defined in 
                                            
40 IRPR, supra note 6, s. 231(3)(b). 
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section 48 of IRPA as a removal order which has come into force and is not 
stayed.  When a removal order becomes enforceable the subject of this 
removal order has an obligation to leave Canada immediately and if he fails 
to do so, Canadian immigration authorities have an obligation to enforce the 
removal as soon as practicable.41  Therefore, very often, a stay of a removal 
order is the individual’s last recourse in Canada. 
 An understanding of the difference between a removal order that has 
come into force and an enforceable removal order is of paramount 
importance.42  As it appears from subsection 48(1) of the Act, for a removal 
order to become enforceable, two conditions must be met: (1) the removal 
order must come into force; and (2) the removal order should not be stayed. 
In the previous paragraphs, we examined the realization of the first condition: 
the coming into force of a removal order.  The following paragraphs deal 
with circumstances that prevent a removal order which has already come into 
force from becoming enforceable.  These circumstances trigger a stay of the 
removal order which has already come into force.   
PART I – STATUTORY AND ADMINISTRATIVE STAYS 
 At the outset, it is worthwhile pointing out that a stay, whether 
statutory, administrative or judicial, does not eliminate a removal order. It 
simply suspends its enforcement.  A removal order which has been stayed 
becomes unenforceable for the duration of the stay.   
 A removal order may be stayed through three types of stays: statutory 
stays, administrative stays and judicial stays.  The main distinction between 
these three kinds of stays is their source. To be more precise, statutory stays 
                                            
41 IRPA, supra note 5, s. 48(2). 
42 See generally Shephard v. Canada (M.P.S.E.P.), 2008 FC 379 at para. 32, 177 
C.R.R. (2d) 92, 326 F.T.R. 162 (T.D.) [Shephard] (where the Federal Court draws a 
distinction between a removal order that has come into force and an enforceable 
removal order). 
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originate from the Act or the Regulations whereas judicial stays are granted 
by the Courts.  Administrative stays are granted by the Minister or his 
representatives. 
A. STATUTORY STAYS 
 Statutory stays may be found under several legislative and regulatory 
provisions.  These provisions are: sections 50, 68, and paragraph 114(1)(b) of 
the Act and sections 231, 232, and 233 of the Regulations.  
1. STATUTORY STAYS UNDER SECTION 50 OF THE ACT 
 Five situations calling for a statutory stay are enumerated under 
section 50 of the Act, which reads as follows: 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 
50. Stay – A removal order is stayed 
(a) if a decision that was made in a 
judicial proceeding – at which the 
Minister shall be given the 
opportunity to make submissions – 
would be directly contravened by 
the enforcement of the removal 
order; 
(b) in the case of a foreign national 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment 
in Canada, until the sentence is 
completed; 
(c) for the duration of a stay 
imposed by the Immigration Appeal 
Division or any other court of 
competent jurisdiction; 
(d) for the duration of a stay under 
paragraph 114(1)(b); and 
(e) for the duration of a stay 
imposed by the Minister. 
50. Sursis – Il y a sursis de la 
mesure de renvoi dans les cas 
suivants: 
(a) une décision judiciaire a pour 
effet direct d’en empêcher 
l’exécution, le ministre ayant 
toutefois le droit de présenter ses 
observations à l’instance; 
(b) tant que n’est pas purgée la 
peine d’emprisonnement infligée 
au Canada à l’étranger; 
(c) pour la durée prévue par la 
Section d’appel de l’immigration 
ou toute autre juridiction 
compétente; 
(d) pour la durée du sursis 
découlant du paragraphe 114(1); 
(e) pour la durée prévue par le 
ministre. 
 The purpose of subsection 50(a) of the IRPA is to ensure that the 
immigration authorities do not remove an individual whose presence is 
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required by the Canadian Courts.  The Courts construe this provision very 
carefully so that potential deportees do not place themselves in a situation 
where their presence is required with the sole objective of avoiding 
deportation. Hence, the Courts generally rule that a stay arises only if the 
person concerned is subject to a judicial order containing specific provisions 
which would be violated if a deportation order were to be enforced or 
executed.43  According to the jurisprudence of the Federal Court, the 
expression “direct contravention of a court order” provided in subsection 
50(a) of the Act requires that an express provision of an order be 
incompatible or irreconcilable with removal of the person concerned.44   
 Statutory provisions must be construed consistently with the scheme 
and object of the Act and the intention of Parliament. Therefore, in certain 
circumstances, even if an individual’s removal may seem to contravene a 
Court order, the statutory stay will not be applicable.  For instance, in 
Cuskic,45 the Federal Court of Appeal considered whether the execution of a 
removal order against a person subject to a probation order that contained a 
direction to report to a probation officer on a specific, periodic basis, would 
directly contravene the probation order so as to invoke the statutory stay 
available under paragraph 50(1)(a) of the former Immigration Act.  The Court 
of Appeal acknowledged that the obligation of the person concerned to report 
regularly to his probation officer required that he be in Canada. 
Notwithstanding this, the Court of Appeal found that paragraph 50(1)(a) 
could not be literally interpreted without giving appropriate consideration to 
the overall scheme of the former Immigration Act. The Court added at 
                                            
43 Mobtagha v. Canada (M.E.I.) (1992), 53 F.T.R. 249 (T.D.) [Mobtagha]. 
44 Alexander v. Canada (Solicitor General.), 2005 FC 1147, [2006] 2 F.C.R. 681, 
279 F.T.R. 45, 49 Imm. L.R. (3d) 5 (T.D.) [Alexander]. 
45 Cuskic v. Canada (M.C.I.), [2001] 2 F.C. 3, 148 C.C.C. (3d) 541, 186 F.T.R. 299 
(F.C.A.) [Cuskic]. 
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paragraphs 25 and 26 that a contrary interpretation would result in absurd and 
unjust consequences since it would defeat the purpose of the Act, which was 
under the former Immigration Act and still is under the current Immigration 
and Refugee Protection Act to remove quickly from Canada persons who are 
inadmissible. 
 Similarly, in Alexander,46 the Court had to decide whether an order of 
the Ontario Court of Justice granting Ms. Alexander sole custody of her two 
Canadian born children, and further ordering that they not be removed from 
Ontario, created a statutory stay pursuant to subsection 50(a) of the IRPA, 
staying the operation of a valid removal order issued in respect of Ms. 
Alexander.  The Federal Court determined that the Ontario Court’s order 
would only be directly contravened if either of Ms. Alexander's children were 
removed from Ontario.  The Court observed that the removal order applied 
only to Ms. Alexander, because her two children were Canadian citizens who 
enjoyed an absolute right to remain in Canada. Thus, the removal order did 
not interfere with the physical location of Ms. Alexander's children.  The 
Court was of the view that faced with removal, Ms. Alexander could apply to 
the Ontario Court of Justice for a variation of its order, or Ms. Alexander 
could make arrangements to leave her children in Canada.  The Court did not 
think that the granting of custody, or sole custody, necessitates the custodial 
parent maintaining physical care of a child at all times. 
                                            
46 Alexander, supra note 44. Contra Ball v.  Canada (M.C.I.), 2005 FC 1609, 2005 
CarswellNat 3927 (T.D.) [Ball] (where the Court had to decide whether the removal 
of an Applicant who applied for divorce and for custody of his three children, 
would contravene an order of the Quebec Superior Court prohibiting the removal of 
the children from Canada without the consent of the other parent.  The facts of this 
case are particularly complicated because while two of the Applicant’s children 
were Canadian born citizens and could not be removed, the oldest child was a 
foreign national.  Moreover, the Applicant was asking for a deferral in order to be 
present at the hearing for custody.  The Court distinguished Alexander, on the basis 
that in Ball the oldest child was a foreign national.) 
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 Also, in Perez,47 the Court found that subsection 50(a) of the Act is 
not applicable to an individual who was found not criminally responsible on 
the charge of first degree murder owing to his mental illness, and who after 
spending 11 years in a forensic psychiatric institution was released by the 
British Columbia Review Board under certain conditions.  The Court did not 
believe that the Applicant’s removal would directly contravene the conditions 
imposed by the Review Board, the conditions being that he had to appear for 
examination if summoned.   
 In Garcia,48 the applicant removed her child from Mexico without the 
father’s consent.  The father filed a motion with the Superior Court of Quebec 
in accordance with section 20 of the Act respecting the civil aspects of 
international and interprovincial child abduction.   The Quebec Court of 
Appeal dismissed the motion deciding that the child was already settled in his 
new environment.   On the basis of this decision, the child’s mother asked for 
a stay of removal in accordance with subsection 50(a) of the IRPA alleging 
that the Quebec Court of Appeal prohibited the child’s removal.  The Federal 
Court agreed and granted the stay motion.  The Minister appealed the 
decision, claiming that the Court erred in determining that the Quebec Court 
of Appeal’s decision amounted to an order prohibiting the child’s removal.  
The Federal Court of Appeal reversed the trial division’s decision and 
concluded that the Quebec Court of Appeal merely dismissed the motion filed 
by the child’s father and that dismissal could not be interpreted as an order 
not to remove the child from Canada. 
 Furthermore, for subsection 50(a) of the Act to apply, the removal 
must contravene an order reached at a judicial proceeding.  In Perez, the 
                                            
47 Perez v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2005 FC 1371 (T.D.) [Perez-1]. 
48 See also Garcia v. Canada (M.C.I. and M.P.S.E.P.), 2007 FCA 75, 289 D.L.R. 
(4th) 378, 41 R.F.L. (6th) 13 (F.C.A.), rev’g 2006 FC 311, [2006] 4 F.C.R. 455, 271 
D.L.R. (4th) 565, 289 F.T.R. 77 (T.D.) [Garcia].  
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Minister’s representative conceded that a proceeding before a review board 
was a judicial proceeding.  In our opinion, it is not.  The Mobtagha49 decision 
provides support for our position.  In that case, the Court held that a removal 
which contravenes an order emanating from the Lieutenant-Governor of a 
province does not trigger the application of an equivalent provision under the 
former Immigration Act because it is not an order made by a judicial body.  
The order was to place an individual found not guilty of an offense due to 
insanity in custody into a psychiatric clinic. 
 A classic example that would trigger a stay of removal under 
subsection 50(a) of the Act would be the case of an individual who has an 
outstanding charge in the criminal courts or was served with a subpoena.  
Section 234 of IRPR leaves no doubt that this type of situation will result in 
statutory stays under subsection 50(a) of the Act.  Section 234 of the 
Regulations reads as follows: 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations 
234. For greater certainty and for 
the purposes of paragraph 50(a) of 
the Act, a decision made in a 
judicial proceeding would not be 
directly contravened by the 
enforcement of a removal order if 
(a) there is an agreement between 
the Department and the Attorney 
General of Canada or the attorney 
general of a province that criminal 
charges will be withdrawn or 
stayed on the removal of the person 
from Canada; or 
(b) there is an agreement between 
the Department and the Attorney 
General of Canada or the attorney 
234. Il est entendu que, pour 
l’application de l’alinéa 50a) de la 
Loi, une décision judiciaire n’a pas 
pour effet direct d’empêcher 
l’exécution de la mesure de renvoi 
s’il existe un accord entre le 
procureur général du Canada ou 
d’une province et le ministre 
prévoyant : 
(a) soit le retrait ou la suspension 
des accusations au pénal contre 
l’étranger au moment du renvoi; 
(b) soit le retrait de toute 
assignation à comparaître ou 
sommation à l’égard de l’étranger 
au moment de son renvoi. 
                                            
49  Mobtagha, supra note 43. 
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general of a province to withdraw 
or cancel any summons or 
subpoena on the removal of the 
person from Canada 
 It is important to point out that the burden is on the Minister to prove 
that section 234 of the Regulations is applicable.  Therefore, it is always 
more prudent for the Minister to adduce into evidence a formal written 
agreement between the Attorney General of Canada or of a province.  In Del 
Milagro,50 the Minister attempted to prove that such an agreement existed by 
producing a sworn declaration from an immigration officer attesting that the 
Minister and the Attorney General’s office reached an oral agreement to 
withdraw the criminal charges on removal of the Applicant.  The Court 
concluded that such evidence of an agreement was insufficient since the 
removal of persons from Canada against their will is a matter of great 
significance to them.  The Court ruled that an agreement should be evidenced 
in writing and such evidence should be properly placed before the Court 
where the respondent takes the position that paragraph 50(a) of the Act does 
not operate a stay of removal of a person.   
 Subpoenas and summons may also trigger a stay of removal.  Yet, 
they should not be mistaken for a Notice of Examination in a civil action. The 
latter does not operate a stay of removal.51 
 In sum, three important observations may be made from the Federal 
Court’s recent case law with respect to subsection 50(a) of the Act.  First, the 
Federal Court seems to have given a narrow scope to the analysis under 
subsection 50(a), particularly to the words “directly contravened”.  Secondly, 
the Court readily refers to the case law surrounding paragraph 50(1)(a) of the 
former Immigration Act because of the similarity between these two 
                                            
50  Del Milagro v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2003 FC 1196 (T.D.) [Del Milagro]. 
51 Shulgatov v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2002 FCT 12 (T.D.) [Shulgatov]. 
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provisions.  Finally, the Court cautions against reading the wording of 
subsection 50(a) of the Act in isolation.  Instead, the Court prefers construing 
the provisions of the Act harmoniously with its scheme and object and with 
the intention of Parliament, including the consideration that non-citizens do 
not have an unqualified right to enter or remain in Canada, and that a valid 
deportation order must be enforced as soon as is reasonably practicable.52 
 A statutory stay of removal will also apply when the foreign national 
is completing his or her sentence of imprisonment in Canada.  The Courts are 
often faced with the argument that probation, parole and conditional 
discharge are “terms of imprisonment” pursuant to subsection 50(b) of the 
Act; therefore, a person under a probation order or parole cannot be removed. 
Subsection 128(3) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act53 provides 
that for the purposes of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, the 
sentence of an offender who has been released on full parole or statutory 
release is deemed to be completed unless the full parole or statutory release 
has been suspended, terminated or revoked.  In addition, in Mokelu,54 the 
Court specified that a “term of imprisonment” in subsection 50(b) of the 
IRPA means a sentence of incarceration served in a penitentiary, jail, 
reformatory or prison.  Therefore, non-custodial sentences served outside a 
penitentiary, jail, reformatory or prison are not terms of imprisonment for the 
purposes of subsection 50(b) of the Act.  It is now settled law that for the 
purposes of section 50 of the Act, probation,55 parole,56 conditional 
                                            
52 Perez-1, supra note 47 at para. 16. 
53 R.S.C. 1992, c. 20. 
54 Mokelu v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2002 CFPI 757 [Mokelu]. 
55 Charles v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2005 FC 799 (T.D.) [Charles]; Mokelu, ibid. 
56 Jones v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2002 FCT 392 (T.D.) [Jones]; Gordon v. Canada 
(Solicitor General), [1993]  F.C.J. No 832 (T.D.) [Gordon]. 
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sentences,57 and conditional discharge58 are not terms of imprisonment and do 
not bar removal.   However, according to an older case, a judicial interim 
release order by way of recognizance may prevent an individual’s removal if 
it contains a condition requiring the individual to appear before a court.59 
 It is somewhat curious that a conditional sentence is deemed not to be 
a term of imprisonment for the purposes of subsection 50(b).  A conditional 
sentence is not a probationary measure and its primary goal is not 
rehabilitative.  Probation is primarily a rehabilitative sentencing tool.  By 
contrast, conditional sentences include both punitive and rehabilitative 
aspects.60  In certain cases, a conditional sentence may be as onerous as, or 
perhaps even more onerous than, a term of imprisonment, particularly in 
circumstances where the offender is forced to take responsibility for his or 
her actions and make reparations to both the victim and the community, all 
the while living in the community under tight controls.61  It is reasonable to 
contemplate that in such circumstances, the courts will apply subsection 
50(b) of the Act so as to stay the individual’s removal in order to allow full 
reparation to the victim and the community. 
 A statutory stay may also result from an order rendered by the 
Immigration Appeal Division (IAD) of the Immigration and Refugee Board.  
Subsection 50(c) coupled with subsection 68(1) of the Act provide that in 
certain circumstances the IAD may stay a removal order.  To be able to apply 
to the IAD for a stay of removal, the person must have a right of appeal to the 
IAD and must be under an enforceable removal order.  Such persons would 
                                            
57 Mokelu, supra note 54. 
58 Perez-1, supra note 47 at para. 23. 
59 Williams v. Canada (M.C.I.), [1984] 2 F.C. 269 [Williams]. 
60 R. v. Proulx, 2000 SCC 5, 182 D.L.R. (4th) 1, [2000] 4 W.W.R. 21, 140 C.C.C. 
(3d) 449, 30 C.R. (5th) 1, 142 Man. R. (2d) 161, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61 (S.C.C.). 
61 Ibid., p. 92. 
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most likely fall under the description of subsections 63(2) and 63(3) of the 
Act.  These individuals are permanent residents or protected persons against 
whom a removal order has been made.   
 In paragraph 70(1)(b) of the former Immigration Act a test was set 
out for the granting of discretionary relief. It is similar but not identical to the 
test enunciated in section 68(1) of the IRPA. Both provisions direct the IAD 
to consider "all the circumstances of the case".  However, subsection 68(1) of 
the Act contains two additional requirements. First, the IAD must consider 
whether sufficient humanitarian or compassionate considerations exist which 
could justify the requested relief and second, the IAD is expected to consider 
the best interests of any child directly affected by the decision. 
 These slight but important amendments did not affect the IAD’s 
broad discretion in assessing the appropriateness of a stay order. The factors 
that must be taken into consideration by the IAD vary depending on the facts 
in evidence.  The factors outlined in Ribic62 provide a framework in which 
discretionary power may be exercised.   The Ribic factors are the following: 
(1) the seriousness of the offence leading to the deportation order; (2) the 
possibility of rehabilitation; (3) the length of time spent in Canada and the 
degree to which the appellant is established here; (4) the family in Canada 
and the dislocation to the family that deportation would cause; (5) the support 
available to the appellant, not only within the family but also within the 
community; (6) the degree of hardship that would be caused to the appellant 
by his return to his country of origin.  
 There may be appeals where some of the listed factors are not 
relevant. There may also be other factors relevant to an appeal, which are not 
captured in the list, as this list is not exhaustive.  The weight given to any 
factor may also vary depending upon the facts of the case.  In two subsequent 
                                            
62 Ribic v. Canada (M.E.I.), [1985] I.A.B.D. No. 4 (QL) (I.A.D.) [Ribic]. 
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and relatively recent decisions, the Supreme Court upheld the factors set out 
in Ribic.63 
 Subsection 68(2) of the Act allows the IAD, when ordering a stay of 
removal, to impose conditions, to vary or to cancel them.  When an individual 
who was successful in obtaining a stay from the IAD breaches a condition 
imposed by the IAD, his stay may be cancelled.  The IAD is empowered to 
cancel the stay on application by the Minister or on its own initiative.64 
 A removal order is also stayed for the duration of a stay under 
paragraph 114(1)(b) of the IRPA, which states: 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 
114.(1) Effect of decision – A 
decision to allow the application for 
protection has
… 
(b) in the case of an applicant 
described in subsection 112(3), the 
effect of staying the removal order 
with respect to a country or place in 
respect of which the Applicant was 
determined to be in need of 
protection. 
114.(1) effet de la décision – La 
décision accordant la demande de 
protection a pour effet de conférer 
l’asile au demandeur; toutefois, elle 
a pour effet, s’agissant de celui visé 
au paragraphe 112(3), de surseoir, 
pour le pays ou le lieu en cause, à 
la mesure de renvoi le visant. 
 Subsection 112(3) of the Act concerns an individual who was 
determined to be either inadmissible on grounds of security, violating human 
rights, organized criminality, serious criminality or is excluded pursuant to 
Article 1(F) of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees or 
named in a certificate referred to in subsection 77(1) of the Act.  In other 
words, even though an individual who was determined to be inadmissible, 
                                            
63 Chieu v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2002 SCC 3, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 84 (S.C.C.) [Chieu]; Al 
Sagban v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2002 SCC 4, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 133, [2002] S.C.J. No. 2 
(S.C.C.) [Al Sagban]. 
64 IRPA, supra note 5, s. 68(2)(d). 
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excluded or was named in a Security Certificate cannot obtain refugee 
protection in Canada, he may nonetheless be entitled to an indeterminate stay 
of removal in accordance with paragraph 114(1)(b) of the Act. 
 Before granting a stay under this provision, the Minister will conduct 
three separate assessments.65  First, the Minister will conduct a Pre-Removal 
Risk Assessment (PRRA) under provisions 112(3) and 113(d) of the IRPA. 
These paragraphs provide that applicants who are inadmissible, excluded or 
named in security certificates will have their PRRA applications considered 
based only on the factors set out in section 97 of the IRPA.  If the PRRA 
determination is unfavorable for the Applicant, it ends there – no stay of 
removal will result.  However, if the PRRA results suggest that the Applicant 
would be at risk of torture if deported to his country, then the second 
assessment becomes necessary. 
 The second assessment consists of determining whether the 
individual is a danger to the security of Canada or to the public in Canada.  It 
may also consist of weighing the severity of the acts committed by the 
individual. 
 The third assessment is commonly known as a “restriction 
assessment”. It is a balancing test conducted under section 172 of the 
Regulations.  The balancing test consists of weighing the risk to national 
security or to the public against the risk faced by the foreign national in his 
country of origin. 
 A stay under paragraph 114(1)(b) of the Act will be granted only in 
those circumstances where the risk to national security represented by the 
foreign national is less significant than the risk of torture faced by the 
Applicant in his country.66  It is so, because in Suresh, the Supreme Court of 
                                            
65 Sogi v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2004 FC 853, 254 F.T.R. 129 (T.D.) [Sogi]. 
66 Ibid. 
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Canada made it clear that, before deciding to return a person to a country 
where he or she faces a risk of torture, there must be evidence of a serious 
threat to national security.67 
 A stay under paragraph 114(1)(b) of the Act is not permanent.  
According to subsection 114(2), the stay will be cancelled if the Minister 
determines that the circumstances surrounding the stay have changed.  For 
instance, the country conditions where the individual is being removed to 
may change so drastically that he or she is no longer at risk.  However, 
certain formalities must be followed in the process of re-examining the stay 
granted.  These formalities are prescribed in 173 of the Regulations and they 
include: a notice of re-examination and another three-stage assessment.   
 A stay of removal is also provided for under paragraph 50(e) of the 
Act, which must be read in conjunction with section 230 of the Regulations.  
These two provisions are often referred to as “temporary suspension” or 
“moratorium”.  The Minister may impose a stay on removal orders with 
respect to a country if the circumstances in that country pose a generalized 
risk to the entire civilian population as a result of an armed conflict within 
the country, an environmental disaster or any other similar situation.  The 
enforcement division of the Department of Public Safety has a list of 
countries to which removals cannot be enforced.  This list is subject to 
change depending on circumstances.  The stay of removal under paragraph 
50(e) of the Act and subsection 230(1) of the Regulations is also 
indeterminate in that the Minister may cancel the stay if the circumstances no 
longer pose a generalized risk to the entire civilian population.  Also, this 
“moratorium” stay does not apply to a person who is inadmissible on grounds 
                                            
67 Suresh v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2002 SCC 1, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, 208 D.L.R. (4th) 1, 90 
C.R.R. (2d) 1, 37 Admin. L.R. (3d) 159 (S.C.C.) [Suresh]. 
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of human rights violations, on grounds of criminality or to a person who was 
excluded under section 98 of the Act.68  
2. STATUTORY STAYS UNDER SECTIONS 231, 232 and 233 OF THE 
REGULATIONS 
 Pursuant to section 231 of the Regulations, if a person has been 
determined by the Refugee Protection Division not to be entitled to refugee 
protection, the removal order against that person will be automatically stayed 
until such time as the delay for the filing of the application for leave before 
the Federal Court has elapsed and, if the application for leave is filed, until it 
is finally disposed of by the court, provided that the applicant files that 
application for leave within the prescribed fifteen day period. 
 Thus, the removal order may not be enforced until the Federal Court, 
the Federal Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court, as the case may be, 
dismisses the applicant’s challenge of the IRB’s decision either at the leave 
stage or upon a judicial review hearing if leave has been granted. However, 
there are exceptions to this rule. 
 A stay under subsection 231(2) of the Regulations does not apply in 
cases where the Refugee Protection Division found that the person’s claim 
had “no credible basis”.69  Also, if the person is inadmissible on grounds of 
serious criminality, his removal will not be stayed pursuant to section 231(3) 
of the Regulations.  Similarly, if an immigration officer determines that a 
person’s claim is ineligible for referral to the Refugee Protection Division for 
one of the reasons enumerated under section 101 of the Act, then the removal 
order against that person will come into force seven days after the claim is 
                                            
68 IRPR, supra note 6, s. 230(3). 
69 Section 107(2) of the IRPA confers on the RPD the power to reach a conclusion 
of “no credible basis” when the Applicant presents no credible or trustworthy 
evidence on which the RPD could have made a favorable decision.   
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determined to be ineligible, as provided by section 49(2)(b) of the Act.  This 
seven-day delay is provided to allow the person sufficient time to file an 
application for leave to commence an application for judicial review of the 
ineligibility determination with the Federal Court.  A stay of removal will not 
operate if the subject of the removal order resides or sojourns in the United 
States or St. Pierre and Miquelon and is the subject of a report prepared under 
subsection 44(1) of the Act on their entry into Canada, which would normally 
result in an ineligibility determination.70  
 A removal order is also stayed as soon as the person is notified of his 
right to file a PRRA application.  That stay will remain effective until the 
final determination of that application.  Normally, before removing any 
individual from Canada, the Department of Citizenship and Immigration must 
provide that individual with an opportunity to make a PRRA application.71 
 Therefore, the stay of removal under section 231 of the Regulations 
will normally continue operating under section 232 of the Regulations once 
all proceedings before the IRB have ended.  Thus, in most situations, a stay 
of removal under section 231 of the Regulations will inevitably lead to a stay 
of removal under section 232 of the Regulations because subsection 160(3) of 
the Regulations obliges the Minister to notify the person of his right to a 
PRRA application. 
 It is worthwhile pointing out that only the first PRRA application 
may operate a stay under section 232 of the Regulations.  Indeed, section 165 
of the Regulations specifically provides that subsequent PRRA applications 
do not result in a stay of the removal order.  This however does not prevent 
applicants from seeking a judicial stay of their removal until the final 
determination of their second PRRA application. 
                                            
70 IRPR, supra note 6, s. 231(3)(b). 
71 Ibid., s. 160(3). 
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 Finally, another statutory stay of removal exists for those who apply 
for a permanent resident status from within Canada.  An application for 
consideration to remain in Canada on humanitarian and compassionate 
grounds under section 25(1) of the Act is comprised of two separate and 
distinct assessments.72  The first assessment consists of determining whether 
the Applicant should be exempted from the selection criteria related to 
becoming permanent resident from outside Canada.  The second assessment 
consists of determining whether or not the Applicants intend to establish 
permanent residence in Canada and whether they are admissible.73  The stay 
provided for in section 233 of the Regulations comes into effect only after the 
Minister has assessed the H&C application under the first step of the process 
and determined that H&C considerations or public policy considerations 
justify an exemption. 
It is clear from the text that the stay contemplated by the 
regulation applies to pending applications for permanent 
resident status if and only if the Minister has reached the 
opinion that there are pertinent humanitarian and 
compassionate or policy considerations. The applicant's 
H&C application has not yet reached that stage, and 
therefore, this regulation is not applicable to her 
situation.74 
 This stay will operate until the Minister reaches a final determination 
under the second step of the process.  If the application for permanent 
residence is rejected under the second step, the stay will no longer operate 
and the removal order will become enforceable.   
                                            
72  Ibid., s. 68.  See also Department of Citizenship and Immigration, Operation 
Manual IP-5 “Immigrant Applications in Canada made on Humanitarian or 
Compassionate Grounds” 12 May 2008 at para. 5.5. 
73  IRPR, supra note 6, s. 68, 72(b), (e). 
74 Horvath v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2004 FC 194 (T.D.) at para. 7. 
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B. ADMINISTRATIVE STAYS 
 Administrative stays are not prescribed by law.  They are granted by 
administrative agencies, boards or tribunals.  In the context of immigration 
law, a stay of removal, commonly known as a “deferral to remove” is granted 
by enforcement officers or expulsion officers, also known as “removal 
officers”.  “Removal officer” is a generic term which is often used by the 
Courts and practitioners in reference to officers who are responsible for the 
enforcement of the Act.  A more accurate term for this position is either 
“enforcement officer” or “expulsion officer”.  The difference between these 
two types of officers is that the expulsion officer has powers of arrest 
whereas an enforcement officer does not. 
 The Act contains no reference to removal officers, enforcement 
officers or expulsion officers.  The power to defer removal was discovered by 
the Federal Court in the wording of section 48 of the former Immigration Act, 
which is the equivalent of subsection 48(2) of the IRPA.  The first case to 
recognize such power was Poyanipur75 where the Federal Court reasoned as 
follows: 
[…] removal officers have some discretion under the 
Immigration Act concerning, among other things, the pace 
of the removal once they become involved in making 
deportation arrangements. This is so because the May 
Affidavit indicates in paragraph 8 that removals are to be 
carried out as soon as "reasonably" practicable. This 
language is also found in section 48 of the Immigration 
Act. In my view, this language covers a broad range of 
circumstances which might include a consideration of 
whether it would be reasonable to await a pending 
decision on a H&C application before removal. 
                                            
75 Poyanipur v. Canada (M.C.I.) (1995), 116 F.T.R. 4 (T.D.) [Poyanipur]; see also 
Pavalaki v. Canada (M.C.I.), [1998] F.C.J. No. 338 (T.D.) [Pavalaki]; Lewis v. 
Canada (M.C.I.) (1996), 37 Imm. L.R. (2d) 85 (T.D.) [Lewis]; Saini v. Canada 
(M.C.I.), [1998] 4 F.C. 325 (T.D.) [Saini]. 
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Accordingly, the removal officer does appear to have some 
decision-making power which is subject to judicial review. 
 Since then, several important decisions were rendered by the Federal 
Court where the scope of a removal officer’s discretion was thoroughly 
examined.  In particular, the Courts have attempted to define in these 
decisions the scope of a removal officer’s discretion to defer a removal. 
Although, removal officers’ duties and the scope of their discretionary power 
under section 48 of the Act have been discussed extensively in the 
jurisprudence of the Federal Court, the case law does not provide an 
exhaustive list of factors that should be considered by the officer.  On the 
contrary, with regard to the relevance of various factors, decisions of the 
Trial Division are not entirely consistent.  This is particularly true with 
respect to pending applications on humanitarian and compassionate grounds. 
It is, however, generally agreed that where a removal order is valid and 
effective, immediate removal is the rule and deferral is the exception.76  The 
courts also recognize that a removal officer may consider travel arrangements 
when deciding whether to defer a removal.77  Such arrangements may include 
ensuring that the subject has all necessary documents to travel or that there 
are no medical impediments to travel.  It would not be reasonably practicable 
to remove someone who did not have a travel document or who was seriously 
ill. 
In addition to these factors, the most recent jurisprudence of the 
Federal Court also instructs that a removal officer may consider in the 
                                            
76 Wang v. Canada (M.C.I.), [2001] 3 F.C. 682 at para. 45, 2001 FCT 148, 204 
F.T.R. 5 (T.D.) [Wang]; Prasad v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2003 FCT 614 at para. 29, 234 
F.T.R. 67 (T.D.) [Prasad]. 
77 Pavalaki, supra note 75; Simoës v. Canada (M.C.I.) (2000), 7 Imm. L.R. (3d) 141, 
187 F.T.R. 219 (T.D.) [Simoes]; Wang, ibid; Boniowski v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2004 
FC 1161 (T.D.) [Boniowski]. 
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exercise of his discretion the best interests of a child78 and the existence of a 
pending H&C application that was filed in a timely manner.79  These issues 
will be discussed below in much greater detail. 
1. DUTIES OF THE OFFICER 
 The primary responsibility of enforcement officers is to make 
removal arrangements for persons ordered removed.  Enforcement officers 
are responsible for escorting or accompanying a person subject to removal 
from Canada.  They are also responsible for the safekeeping of documents 
belonging to foreign nationals under a removal order. 
 Although a removal officer has no jurisdiction to consider risk 
allegations, in certain circumstances, he may be required to exercise his 
discretion and defer removal to allow for the assessment of new evidence 
related to the alleged risks.80 
a) Duty to Render a Decision 
 Every time an agency decides to do something or to do nothing it 
renders a decision.81 However, not every communication of information 
amounts to a decision.  For instance, a Direction to Report for Removal is not 
                                            
78 Munar v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2005 FC 1180, 279 F.T.R. 90, [2006] 2 F.C.R. 664 
(T.D.) [Munar]; Simoës, ibid; Boniowski, ibid; Poyanipur, supra note 75; Melo v. 
Canada (M.C.I.), 188 F.T.R. 39, [2000] F.C.J. No. 403 (T.D.)(QL) [Melo]; Paterson 
v. Canada (M.C.I.), [2000] F.C.J. No. 139 (T.D.)(QL) [Paterson];  John v. Canada 
(M.C.I.), [2002] F.C.J. No. 466 (T.D.)(QL) [John]. 
79 Simoës, supra note 77; Antablioghli v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2003 FC 1245 (T.D.) 
[Antablioghli]. 
80 Haghighi v. Canada (M.P.S.E.P.), 2006 FC 372 at para. 24, 289 F.T.R. 150 
(T.D.). 
81 Robert W. Macaulay and James L.H. Sprague, Practice and Procedure before the 
Administrative Tribunals, Loose-leaf ed. (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2004) at 22-
1.  
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a reviewable decision.82  The same can be said of a letter from a visa officer 
indicating that the decision would not be reconsidered; such a letter is viewed 
as a simple courtesy response.83   
 The Federal Court considers the removal officer’s exercise of 
discretion to be a decision-rendering process.84  In the absence of a legislative 
provision specifying the form decisions must take, there is no required format 
for decisions.85  A decision can be oral or written.86  Thus, theoretically, a 
removal officer has no duty to provide a written decision.  While there is no 
requirement to make a request to defer removal in writing, it is preferable for 
evidential purposes to submit a request in writing.  Moreover, a written 
request is more likely to culminate in a written response.  By the same token, 
communicating a decision orally, especially through the telephone, may be 
problematic.  In Hinson,87 the Court refused to recognize as a decision a 
simple telephone call, in response to a written inquiry, from a departmental 
official in which the official advised the applicant that his request for 
admission to Canada on humanitarian and compassionate (H&C) grounds had 
been granted.  Following this telephone call, Hinson received a letter denying 
his H&C application.  The Court explained that given the repercussions of 
such a decision on an applicant, a simple telephone call could not be a final 
determination of an application and consequently was not a reviewable 
decision. 
                                            
82 Tran v. Canada (M.C.I), 2005 FC 394 at para. 2 (T.D.) [Tran]; Alaa, supra note 
14. 
83 Brar v. Canada (M.C.I.), (1997), 140 F.T.R. 163 (T.D.). 
84 Adviento v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2003 FC 1430 at para. 19 (T.D.) [Adviento]; 
Huseine v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2005 FC 388 (T.D.) [Huseine]. 
85 Macaulay and Sprague, supra note 81 at 22-53. 
86 Shooters Sports Inc. v. Nova Scotia (Liquor License Board) (1996), 45, Admin. 
L.R. (2d) 112 (N.S.S.C.). 
87 Hinson v. Canada (M.C.I.), (1994), 29 Admin. L.R. (2d) 114 (T.D.) [Hinson]. 
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 A removal officer’s decision also has important repercussions on an 
applicant.  If a removal officer decides to inform the applicant of his decision 
by telephone, the applicant may find himself in a difficult situation in case he 
decides to seek a judicial review of that decision because the courts may 
follow the Hinson case and not view a telephone call as a reviewable 
decision.   
 However, such scenarios are hypothetical because removal officers 
have a practice of replying in writing to requests for deferral.  Officers send a 
standardized letter wherein they inform the applicant that they considered his 
or her request to defer, but did not think that it was justified in the 
circumstances.  A typical refusal to defer removal by a removal officer would 
state that: 
The Minister has an obligation under section 48 of the 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act to carry out 
removal orders as soon as practicable. Having considered 
your request, I do not feel that a deferral of the execution 
of the removal order is appropriate in the circumstances 
of this case. 
These types of letters were held to be sufficient in many recent 
decisions of the Federal Court.88 
The nature of the removal officer’s decision is one where the decision-
maker has a very limited discretion.  Therefore, the Courts are of the view 
that no actual, formal decision is mandated in the legislation or regulations to 
defer removal.89  Instead, the jurisprudence instructs that an officer must 
acknowledge that he or she has some discretion to defer removal, if it would 
not be "reasonably practicable" to enforce a removal order at a particular 
                                            
88 Wright v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2002 FCT 113 (T.D.) [Wright]; Boniowski, supra note 
77; Charles, supra note 55; Mann v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2004 FC 1763 (T.D.) [Mann]. 
89 Boniowski, ibid. 
 
 
 
…/35
point in time.90  It is sufficient for an officer to mention that he or she 
considered the request and did not think that a deferral was appropriate or 
justified. 
 Although the Courts recognize that written reasons are not required, 
in many cases they urge removal officers to take notes.91  In Boniowski the 
Court explained that the recording of written notes which set out the reasons 
for an administrative decision fosters better decision-making, and provides a 
basis of explanation if such decision is challenged on judicial review. 
b) Duty to Consider all the Evidence 
 In support of his or her request, the applicant must submit the 
evidence justifying the deferral.  A failure to present all the evidence to the 
removal officer in support of his request for deferral will prevent the 
applicant from relying on this evidence in support of a motion to stay the 
removal order with an underlying application challenging the removal 
officer’s decision.  It is trite law that on judicial review, as well as on stay 
applications, the Court can consider only the evidence which was placed 
before the decision-maker.92 
 Although a request to defer removal is a proceeding which need not 
include a face-to-face hearing, the decision-maker must nonetheless review 
all the evidence and arguments submitted in support of the application.93  
Failure to consider relevant evidence constitutes a breach of natural justice. 
However, the officer has no duty to make further inquiries or obtain 
                                            
90 Ibid. 
91 See e.g. Boniowski, supra note 77 at para. 12. 
92 Pandher v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2006 FC 80 (T.D.) [Pandher]; Gallardo v. Canada 
(M.C.I.), 2003 FCT 45 at paras. 7-8, 230 F.T.R. 110 (T.D.) [Gallardo]. 
93 Hailu v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2005 FC 229 at para. 22, 27 Admin. L.R. (4th) 222  
(T.D.) [Hailu]; R. Macaulay and J. Sprague, supra note 81, at 22-7. 
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additional information from anywhere else, including other agencies.94  In 
Hailu,95 the Applicant was alleging that the removal officer had a duty to 
obtain the applicant’s PRRA Application from the Department of Citizenship 
and Immigration.  The Court rightly dismissed this argument. Similarly, the 
removal officer has no obligation to seek out and analyze the submissions in 
the H&C application even when he knows that such an application has been 
submitted.96  Furthermore, the officer has no duty to defer removal on his 
own initiative if no request to do so has ever been made.97 
c) Duty to Provide Reasons 
As mentioned previously, to the extent that it is practical to do so, an 
agency must always strive to provide reasons for its decision.98  The Supreme 
Court of Canada outlined a number of purposes that reasons may serve.99  
With respect to removal officers, the Federal Court acknowledges that while 
note-taking is not mandatory, the recording of written notes by removal 
officers should be encouraged.100  However, a question that needs to be 
answered is whether these notes should be taken to constitute the removal 
officer’s reasons.  In some cases, the Courts viewed that they did.101 
The most recent case law indicates that even the complete absence of 
written reasons from a removal officer is not in and of itself a reason for the 
                                            
94 Hailu, ibid. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Haghighi, supra note 80 at para. 30. 
97 Mann, supra note 88; Thompson v. Canada (M.P.S.E.P.), 1 December 2008, Imm-
5188-08, de Montigny J. [Thompson]. 
98 Macaulay and Sprague, supra note 81, at 22-55. 
99 Baker v. Canada (M.C.I.), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, 174 D.L.R. (4th) 193, 243 N.R. 
22, 14 Admin. L.R. (3d) 173 (S.C.C.) [Baker]. 
100 Boniowski, supra note 77 at para. 12. 
101 Osei v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2005 F.C.J. No.1667 (T.D.). 
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reviewing Court to intervene.102  There is however one case where the Court 
stated in an obiter that a complete absence of reasons raises a serious issue: 
Notwithstanding the decision of the Court in Hailu v. 
Canada (Solicitor General), 2005 FC 229 (where no 
question was certified), with great respect, I would likely 
have concluded that a serious issue arose from the 
absence of any explanation anywhere for the decision not 
to defer removal (i.e. whether contained in the officer's 
notes, in the decision letter or by affidavit). This Court 
has held that a refusal of deferral may carry profound 
implications for the person concerned. (See, for example, 
Thomas v. Canada (M.C.I.) 2003 F.C. 1477). Accordingly, 
I wish to underscore the Court's comments in Boniowski v. 
Canada (M.C.I.), 2004 FC 1161 that the respondent 
minister should "encourage" as a regular practice the 
keeping of notes by removals officers with respect to the 
exercise of their discretion whether to defer removal. Such 
notes fulfill any reasons requirement and would allow the 
Court to consider allegations of bias, fettering of 
discretion, breach of principles of fairness and the like. 
The absence of any note, affidavit or meaningful statement 
in a decision letter as to why deferral was refused should 
not, in my view, be allowed to immunize from effective 
judicial review the exercise of an, albeit limited, 
discretion.103 
 Moreover, if the removal officer took notes and the applicant requests 
them in accordance with the law, the officer is obliged to provide them.104  
Failure to provide these notes upon request, if such notes exist, may raise a 
serious issue at the stage of a judicial stay application.105  If, however, the 
                                            
102 Boniowski, supra note 77; Mann, supra note 88; Charles, supra note 55; Hailu, 
supra note 93.  
103 Man v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2005 FC 454 at para 13 (T.D.) [Man]. Cf. Jones v. 
Canada (M.C.I.), 2007 FC 302 at para. 14 (T.D.) [Jones-1]. 
104 Thomas v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2003 FC 1477 (T.D.) [Thomas]; Guizar v. Canada 
(M.C.I.), 10 july 2006, IMM-3730-06, Gauthier J (T.D.). 
105 Thomas, ibid; Guizar, ibid. 
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applicant fails to request the officer's reasons or her notes to file, he will be 
barred from raising this issue in an application for a stay of removal before 
the Federal Court.106  
PART II – JUDICIAL STAYS 
A. POWER AND JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
1. PROVINCIAL SUPERIOR COURTS 
 The jurisdiction of the provincial superior courts is general and 
inherent.  Their jurisdiction to administer federal as well as provincial law is 
to be presumed.107  This presumption admits of exceptions.  Where, in 
accordance with section 101 of the Constitution Act, the federal Parliament 
sets up additional courts for the better administration of some federal 
statutes, the Parliament thereby shows an intention to derogate from the 
principle that provincial superior courts have jurisdiction in those matters.108  
In other words, when Parliament grants exclusive jurisdiction to a special 
court for the administration of specific laws, provincial superior courts are 
stripped of their jurisdiction over the same laws.109 
 There are two limitations to the federal Parliament’s power to 
encroach on provincial superior courts’ jurisdiction.  First, the jurisdiction 
conferred upon the special court must be founded on exclusive federal powers 
under section 91 of the Constitution Act.110  Secondly, the federal Parliament 
                                            
106 Chavez v. Canada (M.P.S.E.P.), 2006 FC 830 at para. 17 (T.D.) [Chavez]. 
107 Board v. Board, [1919] A.C. 956 at 962-963 (J.C.P.C.); Ontario (A.G.) v. 
Canada (A.G.), [1947] A.C. 127 at 151 (J.C.P.C.); Three Rivers Boatman Ltd. V. 
Conseil canadien des relations ouvrières, [1969] S.C.R. 607 at 618-619 (S.C.C.); 
Northern Pipeline Agency v. Perehinec, [1983] 2 S.C.R. 513 at 521-522 (S.C.C.). 
108 Canada v. Foundation Co. of Canada, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 695 (S.C.C.). 
109 Canada (A.G.) v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 307 at 328-
329 (S.C.C.). 
110 Ibid. 
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lacks the constitutional authority to strip the provincial superior courts of the 
power to declare a federal statute unconstitutional.111 
 The federal Parliament exercised its power under section 101 of the 
Constitution Act and established the Federal Courts.  The principal grant of 
exclusive jurisdiction to the Federal Courts is in respect of judicial review of 
federal administrative tribunals.   
 Since the inception of the Federal Courts, the provincial superior 
courts no longer have jurisdiction to hear applications for a judicial review of 
decisions emanating from federal administrative tribunals, unless the 
constitutionality of a statute or that of a provision is in issue.112  For this 
reason, the Federal Court has an exclusive mandate over immigration 
matters.113 Thus, provincial superior courts have no jurisdiction to hear stays 
of removal which do not involve constitutional issues.  Only in those cases 
where challenges to the constitutionality of a statute or the Charter are raised, 
do the superior courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Federal Courts to 
entertain stay motions.114  Regrettably, litigants, who are unsuccessful before 
the Federal Court, often bring stay motions before provincial superior courts 
and raise constitutional issues only in order to grant jurisdiction to the 
superior courts.  The superior courts consistently refuse to hear such 
                                            
111 Ibid. 
112 Pringle v. Fraser, [1972] S.C.R. 821 at 826 (S.C.C.); May v. Ferndale 
Institution, 2005 SCC 82, 261 D.L.R. (4th) 541, [2006] 5 W.W.R. 65, 204 C.C.C. 
(3d) 1, 34 C.R. (6th) 228, 136 C.R.R. (2d) 146, 38 Admin. L.R. (4th) 1, 49 B.C.L.R. 
(4th) 199 (S.C.C.). 
113 Pringle v. Fraser, ibid.; May v. Ferndale Institution, ibid.; Zundel v. The Queen, 
(2004) 186 O.A.C. 196, 241 D.L.R. (4th) 362 at 366. 
114 Zundel, ibid. at 366; Torres-Samuels (Guardian ad item of) v. Canada (M.C.I.) 
(1998), 42 Imm. L.R. (2d) 290 (B.C.S.C.), at 298 [Torres-Samuels], aff’d 158 
D.L.R. (4th) 254, [1999] 1 W.W.R. 343, 49 B.C.L.R. (3d) 7 (BC.C.A.). 
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applications and refer parties back to the Federal Court.115  The Supreme 
Court, as well as provincial courts of appeal, confirmed that in immigration 
matters, superior courts should yield jurisdiction to the Federal Court even 
when both courts have a concurrent jurisdiction.116  The Courts explained that 
the legislator has put in place complete, comprehensive and expert procedure 
for the review of administrative decisions in immigration matters and the 
Federal Court is rather the effective and appropriate forum. 
 In Nagalingam, the Ontario Superior Court held that : “In rare 
immigration cases where the constitutional or Charter issue is preeminent, it 
may be appropriate for this Court to assume jurisdiction, as the Court of first 
instance, not by a back door attempt at an appeal when all other remedies 
run dry.  Such was the case in Ahani v. Canada (Attorney General) [2002] 
O.J. No. 90 (C.A.)”.117  If the lis of the application can be properly 
characterized as an immigration matter, the superior Court should refuse to 
hear it.118  In Ahani,119 the provincial superior court refused to decline 
jurisdiction and heard the stay motion.  In that case, the issue was whether 
the applicant had a constitutional right as a principle of fundamental justice 
guaranteed by s. 7 of the Charter, not to be removed from Canada until his 
petition to the United Nations Human Rights Committee had been considered.  
                                            
115 Nagalingam v. Canada (A.G.), 5 December 2005, Wilson J., (Ont. Gen. Div.) 
[Nagalingam]; Zolfiqar v. R. (1998), 49 Imm. L.R. (2d) 116 (Ont. Gen. Div.); 
Torres-Samuels, ibid.; Hazinsky c. Canada (P.G.), [2004] J.Q. no 9237 (Q.S.C.); 
Gosczyniak v. Lewis, (2001) 16 Imm. L.R. (rd) 74; R. v. Judge, [1998] Q.J. No. 
2322 (QL); Sara Centre de prévention Parthenais, [1995] J.Q no. 2465. 
116 Reza v. Canada, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 394; Francis (Litigation guardian of) v. Canada 
(M.C.I.), [1999] O.J. No. 3853, (1999) 179 D.L.R. (4th) 421 (Ont. C.A.) [Francis]; 
Zundel, supra note 113, at 366; Torres-Samuels, supra note 114; Re Peiroo v. 
Canada (M.E.I.) (1989) 69 O.R. (2d) 253 (Ont. C.A.). 
117 Nagalingam v. Canada (A.G.), supra note 115 at para. 37. 
118 Francis, supra note 116 at para. 12. 
119 Ahani v. Canada (A.G.), [2002] O.J. No. 90 (Ont. C.A.). 
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This case revolved more around the Charter and international law issues than 
around immigration law.  Therefore, the provincial superior Court had as 
much expertise in these matters as the Federal Court did.  Moreover, Ahani 
had not exhausted his remedies before the Federal Court before turning to the 
provincial courts.   
 One last point worth mentioning is the superior courts’ parens 
patriae jurisdiction.  Parens patriae is a part of a superior court’s general 
jurisdiction as opposed to its inherent jurisdiction.120  It is founded on the 
need to act for the protection of those who cannot care for themselves.121  
Children of prospective deportees bring applications to the superior courts of 
a province asking them to order a stay of their parents’ removal.  The Courts 
systematically refuse to hear these applications, either on the basis that 
parens patriae jurisdiction should be exercised only where the legislative 
scheme in place contains a gap which needs to be filled by the court in order 
to protect the best interests of a child,122 or on the basis that the lis of these 
applications is an immigration matter and the Federal Court is a more 
appropriate forum.123  In Quebec, the Superior Court does not have parens 
patriae jurisdiction because family law issues are entirely governed by the 
Civil Code of Quebec. 
                                            
120 T.H. Jacob, “The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court” (1970) 23 Curt. L. Prob. 23 
at 51; Torres-Samuels, supra note 114. 
121 Re Eve, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 388 at 425.  
122 Torres-Samuels, supra note 114. 
123 Francis, supra note 116; John (Litigation guardian of) v. Canada (M.C.I.), 
[1998] O.J. No. 2215 (Ont. Gen. Div.), aff’d [2000] O.J. No. 883 (Ont. C.A.); Khair 
v. Canada (A.G.), 2006 QCCS 1246 2006 J.Q. 2057 (QL). 
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2. FEDERAL COURTS 
 The jurisdiction of the Federal Court is exceptional and statutory; 
thus, it cannot be presumed.124   Unless a specific jurisdiction is assigned to 
the Federal Court by the Parliament in exercise of its powers under section 
101 of the Constitution Act of 1867, the Federal Court has no ratione 
materiae over a particular subject-matter. It is to be contrasted with the 
jurisdiction of the provincial superior courts, which is general and inherent.  
Section 18.2 of the Federal Courts Act empowers the Federal Court to grant 
an interim relief against a federal board pending the disposition of the 
judicial review application.  It is on this basis that the courts are enabled to 
grant stay orders. 
B. NATURE AND SCOPE OF A JUDICIAL STAY 
 There are three basic characteristics of a judicial stay application.  
First, a stay application is an interim relief.  Second, it is an equitable 
remedy.  Third, it is an interlocutory or an incidental proceeding. 
1. INTERIM RELIEF 
 Normally, an order staying the removal of a person under the IRPA 
expires by its own terms upon the disposition of the application for Leave or 
the application for Judicial Review upon which it is grounded.125  A typical 
order granting a stay of removal would state that the order will end upon the 
disposition of the underlying application.  Section 18.2 of the Federal Courts 
Act unequivocally states that an interim relief may be granted pending the 
disposition of the underlying judicial application.  Hence, a stay order, which 
is an interim order, cannot extend beyond the final disposition of the 
underlying application.  In some instances, a stay order may expire even 
                                            
124 David Sgayias, Federal Court Practice, (Toronto: Thomson Canada, 2005), at 1. 
125 Kocak v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2006 FC 54 at para. 4 (F.C.A.) [Kocak]. 
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earlier than upon the disposition of the underlying application.  These are the 
cases that would usually involve a pending permanent residence application 
on humanitarian and compassionate grounds under section 25 of the IRPA.  
For instance, when an applicant files a stay motion asking the Court to 
suspend his removal until the determination of his pending H&C application, 
the Court may grant a stay stating that it will remain effective until the 
earliest of the following: disposition of the underlying application or the final 
determination of the H&C application.  Such orders ensure that the Applicant 
does not get from the Court more than what he asked for.  That is to say, if 
the applicant’s pending H&C, or any other kind of application, has been 
determined, there is no need to wait for the final disposition of the underlying 
application.  Such orders should convene the immigration authorities as well 
because they have control over the length of the stay granted.  Indeed, the 
pace at which an individual’s H&C application is dealt with is a matter within 
the discretion of the immigration authorities.  Therefore, the authorities can 
minimize the period for which the stay granted will be operative by promptly 
making a final determination on the pending H&C application. 
 In other instances, however, the Courts have gone further and granted 
a stay which remained operative even after the disposition of the underlying 
application.  In our view, these types of orders constitute an error of law or 
possibly an excess of jurisdiction.  For instance, in Edwards,126 the Federal 
Court granted a stay of a departure order stating that it would expire when the 
applicant’s application for permanent residence by sponsorship was decided.  
At the time of the hearing, this application had still not been filed.  The 
difficulty with this order was that the disposition of the underlying 
application was likely to take place before the determination of the 
sponsorship application.  Consequently, the stay order would remain 
                                            
126 Edwards v. Canada (M.C.I), 27 September 2004, Simpson J. 
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operative even after the disposition of the underlying application, which goes 
against the wording of section 18.2 of the Federal Courts Act.   
 The Minister appealed this decision to the Federal Court of Appeal 
despite the fact that an interlocutory judgment cannot be appealed pursuant to 
paragraph 72(2)(e) of the IRPA.  In support of his appeal, the Minister 
invoked the only exception to this rule, which allows appeals of interlocutory 
judgments in cases where the motion judge exceeded his or her jurisdiction. 
The Minister was arguing that the Court exceeded its jurisdiction since it 
granted a relief with greater effects than those prescribed by section 18.2 of 
the Federal Courts Act.  Yet, the Federal Court of Appeal disagreed.  It 
declined jurisdiction relying on paragraph 72(2)(e) of the IRPA explaining 
that the motions judge may have committed an error of law, but that there 
were no jurisdictional errors.127 
 However, in at least one previous case – Forde128 – the Federal Court 
of Appeal allowed the Minister’s appeal in similar circumstances.  In Forde, 
the trial division of the Federal Courts, after dismissing the underlying 
application for the first stay of removal, granted a second stay of removal 
until the determination by the Federal Court of Appeal of the Williams case.  
The Minister appealed the decision arguing that the trial division exceeded its 
jurisdiction by granting a stay that had no underlying application.  The Court 
of Appeal agreed with the Minister’s position that the motions judge 
exceeded his jurisdiction by granting a stay that had no longer an underlying 
application. As mentioned previously, the Court of Appeal was able to 
intervene because the nature of the error was jurisdictional.  In the absence of 
a jurisdictional error, privative clauses apply and it becomes impossible to 
appeal an interim order.  
                                            
127 Canada (M.C.I) v. Edwards, 2005 FCA 176 (F.C.A.) [Edwards]. 
128 Canada (M.C.I) v. Forde, (1997), 210 N.R. 194 (F.C.A.) [Forde]. 
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 In Edwards, The Federal Court of Appeal distinguished Forde by 
simply stating that in Forde the stay was granted after the disposition of the 
underlying application.  Therefore, in the Court’s view, there was no longer 
an underlying application to whose disposition a stay application could be 
attached, whereas in Edwards the stay order was made in the context of a 
pending application for leave in the Federal Court.  Unfortunately, Edwards 
was followed by the Federal Court of Appeal in two subsequent decisions.129 
 In our view, the distinguishing made by the Federal Court of Appeal 
in Edwards is incorrect.  In Edwards, there would certainly come a moment 
where the stay order would remain operative despite the expiration of its 
underlying application.  For instance, if the underlying Leave application is 
dismissed, the stay order which is effective until the determination of the 
H&C will continue having effect.  At that point, the difference between the 
facts in Edwards and those in Forde would fade away because there would be 
a valid stay order without an underlying application. 
 The state of the law on this issue is indeed unclear.  The Federal 
Court of Appeal has recently shown reluctance to intervene in such cases 
under the pretext that granting a stay beyond the final disposition of the 
underlying application is not an excess of jurisdiction.  Yet, the Court of 
Appeal also refused to state whether such orders constitute an error of law.  
The trial division would not grant stays that remain operative after the final 
disposition of the underlying application if the Federal Court of Appeal 
clearly stated that such practice constitutes an error of law.  It should be 
pointed out however that the Trial Division admitted on one occasion that it 
committed an error by ordering a stay of removal until the determination of 
the Applicant’s pending H&C application when the underlying application 
was an application for leave with respect to a negative PRRA decision.  In 
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Razzaq, the Court granted the Minister’s motion for reconsideration and 
explained: 
Upon reconsideration of the issue it appears to me that 
the Minister is right.  The matter before the court was an 
application to stay the decision of the removal officer 
pending the outcome of the underlying application for 
leave and, should leave be granted, the application for 
judicial review of the negative PRRA decision.  The issue 
of the H&C application was not before the court.  This is 
a question of jurisdiction that was overlooked. It thus 
becomes a matter that can be reconsidered under Rule 
397.130 
 Similarly, in Kim,131 the Court explicitly ruled that it lacked 
jurisdiction to grant a stay until such time as a decision is made on an H&C 
application.  In our view, the Court’s decision in this case is well founded in 
law since the Federal Court is a statutory court whose authority is determined 
by the language of the Federal Courts Act.  Therefore, for the Federal Court 
to have authority over a matter there must be a statutory grant of authority by 
the Federal Parliament.132  Section 18.2 of the Federal Courts Act, which 
grants the statutory authority to make interim orders on an application for 
judicial review, implicitly states that the Federal Court does not have 
jurisdiction to grant interim orders that extend beyond the final disposition of 
the underlying application.  Thus, the mere failure to comply with the 
statutory requirements granting the power amounts to a jurisdictional error.   
 The Court has recently confirmed in Muhammad133 and Malagon134 
that its jurisdiction is limited by statute so that a stay may only be granted 
                                            
130 Razzaq v. Canada (Sollicitor General), 2006 FC 442 at para. 9 (T.D.) [Razzaq]. 
131 Kim v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2006 FC 629 (T.D.) [Kim]. 
132 Roberts v. Canada, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 322 at paras. 13-15; Canada (Human Rights 
Commission) v. Canadian Liberty Net, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 626. 
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pending the final disposition of the leave application, as opposed to any other 
external event. 
 This issue has not been fully resolved.  Nevertheless, in our opinion, 
the question deserves to be certified on an application for judicial review so 
that the Federal Court of Appeal may settle the matter once and for all. 
2. EQUITABLE REMEDY 
 A stay application, like an injunction, is an equitable and 
discretionary remedy.  Hence, in principle, a person who is seeking the 
remedy must deserve it.135  
a) Clean Hands 
 According to a well established principle “he who has committed 
inequity…shall not have equity”.136  This principle means that in order to 
obtain an equitable relief, the law of equity requires that the applicant come 
before the court with “clean hands”.137  In a recent decision,138 the Federal 
Court of Appeal clarified the application of the clean hands doctrine to 
equitable remedies. Although Thanabalasingham deals with judicial reviews 
application, it is transposable to stay motions since they are both equitable 
remedies.   
                                                                                                                            
134 Malagon v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2008 FC 1068 at para. 64 (T.D.). 
135 Murugappah v. Canada (M.C.I.), [2000] F.C.J. No. 1075 (T.D.); Antonucci v. 
Canada (M.C.I.), [1996] F.C.J. No. 1320 (T.D.) (QL) [Antonucci]. 
136 Jones v. Lenthal (1669) 1 Ch. Ca. 154. 
137 Ksiezopolski v. Canada (M.C.I), 2004 FC 1402 (T.D.) [Ksiezopolski]; Chen v. 
Canada (M.C.I), 2003 FC 1464 (T.D.) [Chen]; Mohar v. Canada (M.C.I), 2005 FC 
952 (T.D.) [Mohar]; Antonucci, supra note 135; Samra v. Canada (M.C.I), 2005 FC 
247 (T.D.) [Samra]; Brunton v. Canada (M.P.S.E.P.), 2006 FC 33 (T.D.) [Brunton]; 
Gabra v. Canada (M.C.I), 2003 FC 1491 (T.D.) [Gabra]. 
138 Thanabalasingham v. Canada (M.C.I), 2006 FCA 14, 263 D.L.R. (4th) 51  
(F.C.A.) [Thanabalasingham]. 
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 The Court of Appeal was asked to answer the following certified 
question : “When an applicant comes to the Court without clean hands on an 
application for judicial review, should the Court in determining whether to 
consider the merits of the application, consider the consequences that might 
befall the applicant if the application is not considered on its merits?” The 
Court explained in that case that in determining whether to exercise its 
equitable power in favor of an applicant who does not come before the Court 
with clean hands, the Court should attempt to strike a balance between, on the 
one hand, maintaining the integrity of and preventing the abuse of judicial 
and administrative processes, and, on the other, the public interest in ensuring 
the lawful conduct of government and the protection of fundamental human 
rights.  
 The appellant – the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration – was 
advancing that where the applicant does not come to the Court with clean 
hands, the Court must refuse to hear or grant the application on its merits 
notwithstanding the consequences it could have on the applicant.  The Court 
of Appeal disagreed, stating that a consideration of the consequences of not 
determining the merits of an application for judicial review is within the 
Judge’s overall discretion with respect to the hearing of the application and 
the granting of relief.  The Federal Court of Appeal added that the factors to 
be taken into account in this exercise include: the seriousness of the 
applicant’s misconduct and the extent to which it undermines the proceeding 
in question; the need to deter others from similar conduct; the nature of the 
alleged administrative unlawfulness; the apparent strength of the case; the 
importance of the individual rights affected; and the likely impact upon the 
applicant if the administrative action impugned is allowed to stand. 
 As a procedural remark, it should be noted that, on several occasions, 
the Federal Court has orally cautioned counsel appearing for the Crown 
against merely writing letters to the Federal Court asking it not to entertain 
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stay applications filed by applicants who appear before the Court without 
clean hands.  The Court has advised counsel rather to make submissions on 
clean hands in their Memoranda. 
 Several types of conduct may cause the applicant not to have “clean 
hands”. 
i) Previous Failure to Appear for Removal 
 The ultimate stage of an unsuccessful immigration process is the 
removal of refused refugee claimants or of other types of foreign nationals. 
Before removing an individual, the immigration authorities notify the 
individual that he is under an enforceable removal order and they ask him to 
appear for his removal at a specific date and place. Often, applicants under an 
enforceable removal order fail to appear for their removal, which results in an 
automatic issuance of a Canada-wide arrest warrant.  Many of these 
individuals are eventually arrested and detained.  In these circumstances, the 
last and the only chance for these individuals to remain in Canada is to bring 
a motion for a stay of their removal. 
 The Federal Court regularly refuses to entertain stay applications 
brought by applicants who have disobeyed Canadian immigration laws and 
have failed to appear for their removal.  The case law of the Federal Court 
suggests that applicants who have failed to show up for their removal do not 
come before the Court with clean hands, therefore do not deserve the exercise 
of the Court’s discretionary and equitable power to grant stays.139  As stated 
by the Court in Araujo: 
The Court routinely hears, on an urgent basis, 
applications to stay the execution of deportation orders. 
However, in the present case, the applicant failed to 
                                            
139 Ksiezopolski, supra note 137; Chen, supra note 137; Mohar, supra note 137; 
Antonucci, supra note 135.  
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institute his proceedings in a timely manner, and he chose 
to disobey a valid deportation order.  As a result, he is in 
Canada unlawfully and a warrant is outstanding for his 
arrest.  In the circumstances, the applicant cannot request 
the Court to exercise its equitable jurisdiction to stay the 
order that he has chosen to disobey.  The request for an 
urgent hearing is therefore denied.140 
 This is even more the case when an applicant fails to attend as 
requested for his removal after his first stay application is dismissed by the 
Federal Court.  The applicant who then brings a second stay motion hoping to 
be heard by a different judge will usually get no sympathy from the Court.141 
ii) Disregard for Canadian Laws 
 According to some decisions, applicants who have shown in the past 
a constant and persistent disregard for Canadian laws do not have clean hands 
and do not deserve an equitable remedy.142  Entering Canada with false 
identity papers, lying to the immigration authorities, fabricating a story, 
concealing one’s identity and having a lengthy criminal record were 
considered to be sufficient reason to deny an equitable remedy.143  Similarly, 
a disregard for Canadian family laws, such as violations of custody and 
access rights, may also be taken into consideration in the relevant 
circumstances.144 
 Occasionally, the Courts have entertained and even granted stays to 
individuals who had lengthy criminal records and who were manifesting a 
                                            
140 Araujo v. Canada (M.C.I.), 27 August 1997, IMM-3660-97 McGillis J. (T.D.). 
141 See e.g.  Antonucci, supra note 135; Chavez, supra note 106; Manohararaj v. 
Canada (M.C.I.), 2006 FC 376 (T.D.). 
142 Brunton, supra note 138; Ksiezopolski, supra note 137; Gabra, supra note 137.  
143 Gabra, supra note 137; Ksiezopolski, supra note 137; Jaouadi v. Canada 
(M.C.I.), 2003 FC 1347, 257 F.T.R. 161  (T.D.) (in a context of a Judicial Review 
application). 
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total disregard for Canadian laws.145  This inconsistent pattern suggests that 
much depends on the values of the judge hearing the application for a stay as 
well as on the facts of the case.  
iii) Misrepresentation 
 In a few cases, the Federal Court has also held that applicants who 
have made misrepresentations to the Canadian immigration authorities or who 
have tried to mislead the Court do not appear before the Court with clean 
hands.146  As prevarication may vary as widely as the individuals making the 
misrepresentations, the following are a few of the primary examples of case 
law with regard to this matter: 
 In Samra,147 the Applicants tried to mislead the Court by alleging that 
they had not filed an H&C application and that their children’s best interests 
had not yet been considered.  When the Court found out that their H&C 
application had been denied and their children’s best interests had already 
been considered, the Court refused to entertain the motion on the basis of a 
lack of clean hands. 
 In Gonzague,148 the Applicant claimed refugee status under a false 
identity and tried to mislead the Refugee Protection Division by giving it 
false information.149  The Court concluded that the Applicant did not come 
before it with clean hands, and thus refused to hear the Applicant. 
                                            
145 See Vaseekaran c. Canada (M.C.I), 2004 FC 913 (T.D.); Dennis v. Canada 
(M.C.I.), 2004 FC 196 (T.D.); Hernandez-Andasol v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2000 F.C.J. 
100 (T.D.); Yusufzai v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2005 FC 113 (T.D.). 
146 Gabra, supra note 137; Samra, supra note 137. 
147 Samra, ibid. 
148 Gonzague v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2001 FCT 1292 (T.D.). 
149 See also Mohar, supra note 137. 
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 Similarly, in Bascombe,150  the Applicant omitted from his 
submissions the fact that he had a serious criminal conviction in Canada.  The 
Court held that the Applicant did not have clean hands.  
 In Duboulay,151 the Court also emphasized the importance of 
applicants having to include all relevant facts in their materials when seeking 
a stay on an urgent basis. The Court noted that facts relating to an applicant 
having disobeyed the law and eluded removal were highly relevant in this 
regard. The Court decided not to entertain the applicant’s motion, “which 
would have the effect of rewarding the applicant for her decision not to 
respect Canada’s laws.” 
b) Delay Defeats Equity 
 In many cases, applicants know the date of their removal well in 
advance but choose to file their motion 24 or 48 hours before their departure.  
Applicants who become aware of their removal date one month before their 
departure are expected to file their motion in a timely fashion and in 
accordance with the Federal Court Rules.  If they attempt to file their motion 
on a last-minute basis, their stay application might fail on for that reason 
alone, since one of the rules of equity is that “delay defeats equity”.152  In 
Matadeen,153 the honorable Justice Pinard held that “‘last minute’ motions for 
stays force the respondent to respond without adequate preparation, do not 
facilitate the work of this Court, and are not in the interest of justice; a stay 
is an extraordinary procedure, which deserves thorough and thoughtful 
consideration”.  This decision has been followed by the Federal Court in a 
                                            
150 Bascombe v. Canada (M.C.I.), 1 June 2007, IMM-2218-07, Shore J. (T.D.). 
151 Duboulay v. Canada (M.P.S.E.P.), 7 January 2007, IMM-216-07, Tremblay-
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number of other cases, most recently in Madi,154 and Casanova,155 where 
Justice de Montigny pointed out:  
I am also deeply concerned by the fact that these last 
minute applications leave counsel for the Respondent very 
little time to receive instructions from their clients; this is 
not only unfair, but it is also not in the best interests of the 
administration of justice. This, in and of itself, would be 
sufficient to dispose of these applications.  
This Court has indicated on a number of occasions its 
reluctance to hear last minute applications for stays of 
removal.156 
3. INCIDENTAL PROCEEDING 
 Because a stay motion is an incidental proceeding, certain procedural 
requirements must be met in order for it to be successfully filed.   
a) There Must Be an Underlying Application 
 First, a stay motion must be filed as part of a principal application.  
In other words, it should be appended as an accessory to a principal 
application, which is also known as an underlying application.  There may be 
more than one underlying application, but there must be at least one.  In an 
immigration context, most of the time, an underlying application is an 
Application for Leave and for Judicial Review pursuant to section 72(1) of 
the IRPA.   
                                            
154 Madi v. Canada (M.C.I), 2007 FC 648 (T.D.) [Madi]. 
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 Pursuant to rule 302 of the Federal Courts Rules, an application for 
judicial review shall be limited to a single decision in respect of which relief 
is sought.  Similarly, an application for leave pursuant to section 72 of the 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act shall also be limited to a single 
administrative decision.157  A leave application must challenge an 
administrative decision, order, act or proceeding which is reviewable as 
contemplated in subsection 18.1(2) of the Federal Courts Act.  Otherwise, 
there can be no underlying application.  For instance, in Alaa,158 the applicant 
filed an application for leave challenging the Direction to Report for Removal 
requiring him to appear for his removal and appended to that application a 
motion for a stay of removal.  The respondent argued that a Notice of 
Direction was not a reviewable administrative decision and that since the 
underlying application was not challenging a reviewable administrative 
decision, it was not valid.  The respondent also argued that there could be no 
stay motion without a valid underlying application.  The Court agreed and 
dismissed the application. 
 Similarly, in Tran,159 the Applicant was also contesting a direction to 
report for removal.  The Court rightly held that a direction to report for 
removal is not a decision or order, as contemplated in section 18.1(2) of the 
Federal Courts Act, and it is thus not reviewable by way of an application for 
judicial review. However, in Tran, the Court did not strike out the stay 
motion for this reason alone because there was a second underlying 
application in this matter, properly filed, which was challenging a PRRA 
decision.  It is to be contrasted with Alaa, where no other valid underlying 
application existed. 
                                            
157 Hisseine v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2005 FC 388 at para. 3 (T.D.); Iamkhong v. Canada 
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 In Thompson, the Federal Court followed these two decisions: 
Moreover, I agree with counsel for the respondent that 
this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this stay 
motion, as the underlying application challenges the 
direction to report for removal, which is not a decision, 
order, act or proceeding reviewable under paragraph 1 
8.1(2) of the Federal Courts Act.  Indeed, this case is 
indistinguishable from Alaa v. Canada (Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration and Minister of Public 
Security and Emergency Preparedness), 2006 FC 14 and 
Tran v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 2005 FC 
394, which both held that a Direction to Report for 
Removal is not a decision or order reviewable by way of 
an application for judicial review.160 
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b) Underlying Application Must Be Filed on Time 
 The underlying application must not only challenge a valid 
administrative and reviewable decision, but it must also be filed within the 
time limits.  Before hearing the stay motion on its merits, the Court must be 
satisfied that the underlying application does not require an extension of 
time.  Paragraph 72(2)(b) of the IRPA requires that the application for leave 
be initiated within fifteen days (or within sixty days in the case of a matter 
arising outside Canada) of the applicant being informed of the decision he or 
she seeks to challenge.  If this underlying application was filed late, the Court 
must first hear the applicant’s application for an extension of time.  If the 
Court denies the extension of time to file the underlying application, the 
underlying application falls.  Consequently, the stay motion should also fall 
as there can be no motion for a stay, without an underlying application.161  
 As an extension of time is a condition precedent to the consideration 
of a late underlying application, the applicant must establish that the motion 
for an extension itself raises a serious issue.  To do so, the applicant must 
demonstrate that there are special reasons, as required by IRPA paragraph 
72(2)(c), for extending the time for filing and serving the underlying 
application.162  The principles governing the granting of an extension of time 
for the service and filing of a leave application are those set out by the 
Federal Court of Appeal in Hennelly.163  The applicant must show a 
continuing intention to pursue the application; that it has "some merit"; that 
                                            
161 Contreras Melendez v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2005 FC 1646 (T.D.); Dessertine v. 
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 14 August 2000, IMM-3931-00, 
Tremblay-Lamer J. (T.D.); Paredes c. Canada (M.C.I.), 20 October 1997, IMM-
3989-97, Noël J. (T.D.) 
162 Semenduev v.Canada (M.C.I.), [1997] F.C.J. No.70 (T.D.); Akpataku v. Canada 
(M.C.I.), 2004 FC 698 (T.D.). 
163 Canada (A.G.) v. Hennelly (1999), 244 N.R. 399. 
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no prejudice to the respondent arises from the delay; and that a reasonable 
explanation for the delay exists. 
C. PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS 
 A motion for a stay of removal is governed by the Federal Courts 
Rules applicable to motions. 
1. NOTICE OF MOTION  
 Pursuant to Rule 359 of the Federal Courts Rules, a motion is 
initiated by a notice of motion.  The notice sets out the time, place, estimated 
duration of the hearing of the motion, the relief sought, the grounds intended 
to be argued and a list of the documents or other material to be used at the 
hearing.  It is mandatory that a notice of motion be made according to Form 
359.164  The Courts are reluctant to strike a motion solely because the notice 
does not comply with Form 359, but they will generally order an amendment 
of the notice.165 
2. MOTION RECORD 
 Rule 364 of the Federal Courts Rules requires that the applicant serve 
a motion and file three copies thereof. 
a) Style of Cause 
 Because a stay motion is an incidental proceeding, the style of cause 
should be the same as the one on the Application for Leave and for Judicial 
Review.  Pursuant to the coming into force of the Department of Public 
Safety and Emergency Preparedness Act,166 all the responsibilities of the 
Canadian Border Services Agency including those with respect to removals 
                                            
164 Grand Tank (International) Inc. v. Destiny Oilfield Rentals, 2004 FC 1082 
(T.D.). 
165 Ibid. 
166 S.C. 2005, c. 10, s. 5. 
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have been transferred to the Minister of Public Safety.  Therefore, when the 
underlying application concerns decisions rendered by an enforcement 
officer, who is an employee of the Canadian Border Services Agency, the 
Minister of Public Safety must be a party to the proceedings.  As a rule of 
thumb, it is probably always prudent to mention the Minister of Public Safety 
in the style of cause because the enforcement of the removal is always 
performed by this Department irrespective of what the underlying application 
is.  The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration must also be a party to those 
proceedings where the underlying application concerns a decision that was 
rendered by an immigration officer.  For instance, Pre-Removal Risk 
Assessment decisions, and decisions on permanent residence applications 
based on humanitarian and compassionate grounds, are the responsibility of 
the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration.  Thus, in a stay motion where 
the underlying application pertains to such decisions, the Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration must appear in the style of cause. 
 In any event, a mistake in the style of cause is never detrimental and 
a party may make an oral request during the hearing to have the style of cause 
amended.   
b) Contents 
 A Motion Record should minimally contain a table of contents, the 
notice of motion, an affidavit, written representations and the exhibits.  With 
regards to the exhibits, it is worthwhile mentioning that a party may produce 
evidence by the means of an affidavit only.  Any documentation intended to be used 
in an application or a motion should be properly sworn to through the use of an 
affidavit. The Record should also contain the decision that the applicant 
challenges in his underlying application.167  The underlying application for 
                                            
167 Mohar, supra note 137; Atwal v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2004 FC 76; Bayavuge c. 
Canada (M.C.I.), 17 April 2007, Imm-1492-07, Blais J. (T.D.); Direction of Justice 
Shore issued on July 13, 2007, in Garza Galan v. Canada (M.C.I.), 13 July 2007, 
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leave and for judicial review must also contain an affidavit.  An application 
for leave not supported by an affidavit is incomplete and cannot succeed.168  
The 30-page limit on memoranda of fact and law imposed by rule 70 also 
applies to written representations for motions under rule 364.169 
c) Timing 
 Normally, a stay motion shall be served and filed at least two days 
before the day set out in the notice for the hearing of the motion.170  For 
instance, in Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver, the general sittings of the 
Federal Court for the hearing of motions are held on Mondays.171  Therefore, 
a Motion Record should be served and filed at the latest on Wednesday.   
i) Premature Applications 
 Generally, a Direction to Report is given to a person after the 
departure order becomes a deportation order pursuant to subsection 224(2) of 
the IRPR.  A departure order does not require an authorization to return to 
Canada whereas the deportation order does.172  Hence, applicants may be 
tempted to move for a stay of their removal before receiving a direction to 
report for their removal and before their departure order becomes a 
deportation order so that they do not need to obtain an authorization before 
returning to Canada.  According to many cases, an application for a stay of 
removal is premature if it is filed before a date of removal is set and before 
                                                                                                                            
Imm-2613-07 (Toutes requêtes visant à obtenir un sursis de renvoi devraient 
contenir une copie de la décision et les motifs. Si la requête ne contient pas ceux-ci, 
l'agent du greffe doit aviser le procureur de soumettre dans le plus bref délai une 
copie des motifs). 
168 Metodieva v. Canada (M.E.I.) (1991), 132 N.R. 38, 28 A.C.W.S. (3d) 326 
(F.C.A.); Dhillon v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2009 FC 614 (T.D.). 
169 Chung v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2003 FC 1150 (T.D.). 
170 Federal Courts Rules, supra note 19, r. 362(1). 
171 Ibid., r. 34(1)(b). 
172 IRPR, supra note 6, s. 226(1). 
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the departure order becomes a deportation order. In other words, the stay 
motion is premature if the arrangements to remove the applicant from Canada 
are not in place.  
 In the ordinary course of events, a person subject to an enforceable 
removal order will be called in by CBSA officers.  The person will be given a 
Direction to Report which is a document specifying the date of the person's 
removal from Canada. As mentioned earlier, if no such Direction has been 
given, the stay motion is likely to be ruled premature.173   
 In certain cases, applicants argued that dismissing a stay motion 
because no date of departure has been set is needlessly punitive of those who 
choose to pursue their rights in a timely fashion.  However, this argument has 
been dismissed on several occasions. The Courts view a Departure order as a 
favorable discretion encouraging a voluntary compliance with the Act.  When 
a person chooses not to avail himself or herself of the benefit of this 
favorable discretion by voluntarily leaving Canada within 30 days, he or she 
will be treated as all other deportees.  This simply amounts to a determination 
that one cannot get the benefit of a departure order by agreeing to leave 
Canada and then seek to retain the benefit of that order by filing a stay 
motion.174 
 There are, however, isolated cases where the Court ruled that a 
motion for a stay of removal is not premature simply because the person was 
not directed to report for his or her removal. In Singh, for instance, the 
Federal Court reasoned as follows: 
                                            
173 Rajan v. Canada, [1994] F.C.J. No. 1618, (1994), 86 F.T.R. 70 (T.D.); Essiaw v. 
Canada (M.C.I.), 2001 FCT 1108 (T.D.); Gonzalez v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2002 FCT 
511; Verich v. Canada (M.C.I.), [1996] F.C.J. No. 400 and Weir v. Canada (M.C.I.), 
[1998] F.C.J. No. 494, 1998 CanLII 7757, 17 April 1998, IMM-1679-98 (T.D.); 
Kathirvelu v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2003 FC 1404; Ball, supra note 46; Obatta v. 
Canada (M.P.S.E.P.), 2007 FC 619. 
174 Essiaw, ibid. at para. 13. 
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There is no reason in principle why a person who is 
subject to a removal order should not be permitted to 
seek an interim injunction that would prohibit the 
removal officers from deciding to issue a direction to 
report. In substance, that is what Mr. Singh is asking the 
Court do so. The legal tests for the issuance of such an 
injunction would be substantially the same as for a stay 
of execution. However, I am not persuaded that, in the 
absence of a direction to report, Mr. Singh is at risk of 
irreparable harm.175 
 Similarly, in Clark,176 the Federal Court granted a stay of removal 
even though no date of removal had been set and no arrangements for the 
person’s removal had been made.  In this case, the applicant was arguing that 
the issuance of the deportation order was preventing him from accessing 
Accelerated Day Parole and Unescorted Temporary Absences, to which he 
would otherwise be entitled, as a result of subsection 128(4) of the 
Corrections and Conditional Release Act.  This provision provides that an 
offender against whom a removal order has been made under the Immigration 
and Refugee Protection Act is ineligible for day parole or an unescorted 
temporary absence until the offender is eligible for full parole.  By obtaining 
a stay of his departure order, the applicant could access the accelerated day 
parole program.  Consequently, the Court held that the motion was not 
premature.   
 However, in Fox,177 a case with similar facts, the Federal Court of 
Appeal reached a different conclusion.  In this matter, the National Parole 
Board directed that Fox, a first-time non-violent offender, be released on day 
parole.  Yet, a removal order was about to be issued against Fox in which 
                                            
175 Singh v. Canada (M.C.I.), 1999 CanLII 9171, 3 December 1999, IMM-5306-99, 
Sharlow J. (T.D.); see also Calderon v. Canada (M.C.I.), [1995] F.C.J. No. 393, 92 
F.T.R. 107, 30 Imm. L.R. (2d) 256, 54 A.C.W.S. (3d) 316 (T.D.). 
176 Clark v. Canada (M.P.S.E.P.), 2006 FC 1512 (T.D.). 
177 Fox v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2009 FCA 346 (F.C.A.). 
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case the day parole would automatically become inoperative on the day the 
removal order was to be made and, as a result, Fox would be re-incarcerated 
until his full parole eligibility date.  Fox asked the Immigration Division to 
adjourn his admissibility hearing and his request was granted.  The Minister 
appealed the Immigration Division’s decision to adjourn. The Federal Court 
agreed with the Minister that the Immigration Division had exceeded its 
jurisdiction by adjourning the admissibility hearing.  Fox appealed the 
decision rendered by the Trial Division and requested from the Federal Court 
of Appeal a stay motion.  The Federal Court of Appeal dismissed his motion 
stating that despite the harsh consequences a removal order may have on the 
offender’s release on day parole, a stay order was not warranted. 
 In some decisions, the Federal Court held that it had no jurisdiction 
to grant a stay that was filed prematurely.178  Several other decisions state the 
contrary (and we lean their way): a premature motion is not a jurisdictional 
issue. In appropriate circumstances, the Court has jurisdiction to stay a 
removal order before the person is directed to report for removal.179   
 An applicant need not request an administrative stay before filing a 
stay motion before the Federal Court.  However, if an applicant did request 
an administrative stay, he must give the Minister an opportunity to reply to 
his request before requesting a judicial stay from the Courts.  A stay motion 
will be found premature if an applicant requests an administrative stay and 
then files within a few hours of that request a stay motion without allowing 
the enforcement officer sufficient time to reply to that request: 
                                            
178 Markhevka v. Canada (M.C.I.), 1998 CanLII 8519 (T.D.) at para. 13; Weir, supra 
note 173; Verich, supra note 173.  
179 Muncan v. Canada (M.C.I.), 1998 CanLII 7401, 24 February 1998, Imm-2701-97, 
Campbell J. (T.D.)  
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The Applicants’ scheduled deportation is two weeks 
away.  It is a waste of scarce judicial resources to bring 
this motion where an expectation remains that a timely 
decision will be rendered and where the outcome of that 
process is presently unknown. 
The Court has enough urgent stay motions before it 
dealing with actual decisions that it cannot be burdened 
with premature motions of this sort.  In appropriate cases 
where fairness and due process require a temporary stay 
order, the Court has the authority to preserve the status 
quo until a decision has been made or to allow a party 
enough time to put a proper evidentiary record before the 
Court.  It is not appropriate for an applicant to deem a 
decision to have been made because the Respondent has 
failed to respond by a deadline which the applicant 
unilaterally imposed.  The Respondent is under no legal 
obligation to respond to such demands and it is entitled to 
process these types of requests in a fair and orderly 
manner.180 
 When the Court determines that a stay motion is premature, it may 
either dismiss the motion181 or adjourn it sine die.182  
ii) Late and Last-Minute Applications 
 An applicant who requests pursuant to rule 362(2) of the Federal 
Courts Rules that a stay motion be heard on less than two days notice files a 
late or a last-minute application.  In such cases, an applicant must satisfy the 
Court of the urgency of the motion; otherwise, an urgent motion will not be 
heard.  Last-minute motions will not be entertained by the Court especially if 
                                            
180 Aslam v. Canada (M.P.S.E.P.), 2008 FC 416 (T.D.) at paras. 8-9; see also 
Jackson v. Canada (M.P.S.E.P.), 2007 FC 56 at para. 16 (T.D.). 
181 Aslam, ibid. 
182 Gonzalez, supra note 173. 
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the applicant was aware of the date of his departure for a long time and failed 
to bring a timely motion.183  In Matadeen, the Court explained that: 
[…] last minute motions for stays force the respondent to 
respond without adequate preparation, do not facilitate the 
work of this Court, and are not in the interest of justice; a 
stay is an extraordinary procedure, which deserves 
thorough and thoughtful consideration.184 
 Is the refusal by the motions judge to entertain last-minute motions 
tantamount to a refusal to exercise jurisdiction?  In Ouardi, the Federal Court 
of Appeal answered this question in the negative: 
In the present case, the facts are that the stay application 
could have been made on or shortly after January 7, 2005, 
when the appellant was advised of her scheduled removal 
date. In these circumstances, I tend to think that Blais J. 
properly exercised his discretion not to entertain the very 
late stay motion, that it was within his jurisdiction to do so, 
even though he may not have considered the merits of the 
application, and that the matter is not appealable to this 
Court.185 
 In Wambui Kahiga, the Federal Court explained that unless cogent 
reasons exist to explain the filing of late or last-minute motions, the courts 
should not countenance such unfair tactics: “on this basis alone I am satisfied 
this Court should not exercise its discretion in favor of the Applicant”.186 
                                            
183 Madi, supra note 154; Kroonenfeld v. Canada (1995), 29 Imm. L.R. (2d) 231 
(T.D.); Nananso v. Canada (M.E.I.), (1992), 56 F.T.R. 234; Cyrous Moghaddam v. 
Canada (M.C.I.), 31 May 2004, IMM-4879-04, Martineau J. (T.D.); Iliescu v. 
Canada (M.C.I.), 1 June 2004, IMM-4725-04, Kelen J. 
184 Matadeen, supra note 153; see also Casanova, supra note 155; Ping Shi v. 
Canada (M.P.S.E.P.), 2007 FC 534 (T.D.); Madi, supra note 154. 
185 El Ouardi v. Canada (Solicitor General), 2005 FCA 42 at para. 7 (F.C.A.). 
186 Assumpta Wambui Kahiga v. Canada (M.P.S.E.P.), 7 December 2009, Imm-6135-
09, Mainville J. (T.D.). 
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d) Method of Serving and Filing of Record 
 An originating document, such as an Application for Leave, shall be 
served personally in the manner set out in rule 128 of the Federal Courts 
Rules.  The manner of serving personally on the Crown is set out in rule 133 
of the Federal Courts Rules.  Also, rule 134 of the Federal Courts Rules 
allows that the personal service of a document be effected by the acceptance 
of service by the party’s solicitor.  A stay motion is not an originating 
document; therefore, it need not be served personally.  However, an applicant 
who decides to serve the underlying leave application at the same time as the 
stay motion should serve the proceedings personally.  If the application for 
leave is not properly filed, the stay motion may be struck for absence of an 
underlying application.  Non-personal service may be effected in any one of 
manners described in rule 140 of the Federal Courts Rules.  Although a 
motion record is not an originating document, it may not be served by fax 
without the consent of the recipient.187 
3. RESPONDENT’S MOTION RECORD 
a) Contents 
 The Respondent’s Motion Record shall minimally contain a table of 
contents and written representations.   Filing affidavits or any other material 
in support of the Respondent’s Motion Record is not a requirement. There can 
be no cross-examinations on affidavits because rule 12(2) of the Federal 
Courts Immigration and Refugee Protection Rules contemplates that no cross-
examination of a deponent on an affidavit filed in connection with an 
application is permitted before leave to commence an application for judicial 
review is granted. An affidavit in support of a stay motion where the 
underlying application is an application for leave is no doubt filed in 
                                            
187 Federal Courts Rules, supra note 19, r. 143. 
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connection with that leave application; therefore, rule 12(2) applies to such 
affidavits.  It is however unclear whether a cross-examination on affidavit is 
permitted where a stay motion is filed after leave is granted.    
 As mentioned previously, the 30-page limit on memoranda of fact 
and law under rule 70 of the Federal Courts Rules is applied to written 
representations under rule 364 of the Federal Courts Rules.188 
b) Timing 
 The Respondent shall serve a copy of his Record and file three copies 
thereof not later than 2:00 p.m. on the last business day before the hearing of 
the motion.  In Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver, a Respondent is expected 
to serve and file his record not later than Friday 2:00 p.m. 
c) Method of Serving and Filing of Record 
 The Respondent’s Motion Record is not an originating document; 
therefore, it need not be served personally.  Non-personal service may be 
effected in any one of the manners described in rule 140 of the Federal 
Courts Rules.  Although a motion record may not be served by fax without 
the consent of the recipient, the Respondent’s Motion Record may be served 
by fax if it does not exceed 20 pages.189  The English text of paragraph 143 of 
the Federal Courts Rules creates confusion because it uses the term “motion 
record” which may mean either the Applicant’s Motion Record or the 
Respondent’s Motion Record.190  However, the French text of paragraph 
143(a) of the Federal Courts Rules is clear as it uses the term “dossier de 
requête” as opposed to “dossier de l’intimé”. 
                                            
188 Chung, supra note 169. 
189 Federal Courts Rules, supra note 19, r. 143. 
190 Compare sections 364 and 365 of the Federal Courts Rules. 
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D. TEST FOR OBTAINING A STAY 
 In Immigration matters, this Court established in Toth191 that an 
applicant who seeks a stay of proceedings must meet the stringent test similar 
to that for an interlocutory injunction.  The test requires, for the granting of 
such an order, that applicants demonstrate: (a) that they have raised a serious 
issue to be tried in the underlying judicial review application; (b) that they 
would suffer irreparable harm if no stay of their removal was granted; and (c) 
that the balance of convenience considering the situation of both parties, 
favours the grant of the stay.  The test is conjunctive; if applicants fail to 
meet one part of the test, their motion cannot succeed.   
1. SERIOUS ISSUE 
 Under the first prong of the test, applicants must establish that they 
have raised a serious issue to be tried in the underlying judicial review 
application.  The meaning of the term “serious issue” is derived from the 
decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in Manitoba (Attorney General) v. 
Metropolitan Stores (MTS) Ltd.192 and RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada 
(Attorney General).193  In these two cases, the Supreme Court explained that 
the term “serious issue” means that the application is not frivolous or 
vexatious. Therefore, the threshold is low and involves a preliminary 
assessment of the merits of the case. A prolonged examination of the merits is 
neither necessary nor desirable.194 Once satisfied that the application is 
neither vexatious nor frivolous, the motions judge should generally conclude 
that the serious issue has been raised and should proceed to consider the 
                                            
191 Toth, supra note 4. 
192 Metropolitan Stores, supra note 3. 
193 [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311, 111 D.L.R. (4th) 385, 54 C.P.R. (3d) 114 (S.C.C.) [RJR-
MacDonald]. 
194 Ibid, at 335, 337-338. 
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second and third prongs of the test.  The threshold of the “serious issue to be 
tried” is in fact much lower than the threshold of a prima facie case.195    
 Two exceptions apply to the general rule that a motions judge should 
not engage in an extensive review of the merits.  The first exception arises 
when the result of the interlocutory motion will in effect amount to a final 
determination of the action.  This will be the case either when the right or the 
remedy which the applicant seeks to protect or to obtain can only be 
exercised immediately.196  For instance, when the underlying application of a 
stay motion challenges the enforcement officer’s refusal to defer removal, the 
motions judge should engage in a more extensive review of the merits 
because the grant of the stay of removal will have the practical effect of 
nullifying the enforcement officer’s decision. Indeed, once the stay of 
removal is granted, the underlying application is likely to become moot. 
[…] where a stay would effectively grant the relief sought 
on the underlying application, the “serious issue” 
threshold is not merely that the question raised is not 
frivolous or vexatious. Where a motion for a stay is made 
with respect to a refusal to defer removal, the judge 
hearing the motion ought not simply apply the “serious 
issue” test, but should go further and closely examine the 
merits of the underlying application.197 
 In such cases, the court will require the applicant to meet the 
                                            
195 North American Gateway Inc. v. Canada (Canadian Radio-Television and 
Telecommunications Commission), [1997] F.C.J. No. 628, 214 N.R. 146, at pp. 148-
149 (C.A.); North of Smokey Fishermen's Assn. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2003 
FCT 33 at para. 18, 2003 FCT 33. 
196 RJR-MacDonald, supra note 192 at 344. 
197 Padda v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2003 FC 1081 at para. 6 (T.D.) [Padda]; see also 
Wang, supra note 76; Castillo v. Canada (M.P.S.E.P.), 2008 CF 172; Holubova v. 
Canada (M.C.I.), 2004 FC 527; Perez v. Canada (M.P.S.E.P.), 2007 FC 627; Baron 
v. Canada (M.P.S.E.P.), 2009 FCA 81 (F.C.A.) para. 66 [Baron]. 
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threshold of “likelihood of success” or a prima facie case.198   
 The second exception to the prohibition on an extensive review of the 
merits arises when the serious issue is a question of constitutionality that 
presents itself as a simple question of law.199  For instance, in a motion for a 
stay of removal where the only issue raised by an applicant is the 
constitutional validity of a provision, then the motions judge should settle the 
constitutional question on its merits. 
 The nature of the serious issue depends on the administrative decision 
being challenged in an underlying application.  If the underlying application 
challenges a negative Pre-Removal Risk Assessment decision, then the 
serious issue should relate to this risk assessment.  Similarly, if an underlying 
application challenges a refusal to grant an exemption for humanitarian and 
compassionate grounds, the serious issue should relate to the H&C decision.  
As a rule, if the issue raised by an applicant has already been certified for 
appeal by a Judge of the Federal Court, the “serious issue” prong is easily 
satisfied.200  
 Although the threshold of a serious issue on a stay motion is lower 
than the threshold of an arguable issue on an application for leave,201 it 
cannot be argued that the serious issue prong of the Toth test is automatically 
met if the application for leave has been granted.202  Conversely, if a stay 
                                            
198 Amsterdam v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2008 FC 244 at para. 16 (T.D.); Canada (M.C.I.) 
v. Thanabalasingham, [2003] 4 F.C. 491, 231 F.T.R. 103 (T.D.); Wang, supra note 
76. 
199 RJR-MacDonald, supra note 192 at pp. 346. 
200 Palka v. Canada (M.P.S.E.P.), 2008 FCA 165 at para. 9, 379 N.R. 239 (F.C.A.) 
[Palka]. 
201 Vazquez Lopez v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2007 FCA 1135 (T.D.); Londono Echeverry 
v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2007 FC 497 at para. 16 (T.D.); Brown v. Canada (M.C.I.), 
2006 FC 1250 at para. 5 (T.D.);   
202 Londono Echeverry, ibid. at para. 15. 
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motion is granted, it does not mean that the applicant raised an arguable case 
for the purposes of a leave application.203  Indeed, an application for leave 
may be disposed of on the basis of certain evidence (or lack of it) and the 
stay motion may be decided on the basis of additional or entirely different 
evidence. Hence, the stay motion should not automatically influence the 
outcome of the leave application and vice versa. 
 There can be an indeterminate number of issues raised on an 
underlying application challenging a negative PRRA decision, a negative 
H&C decision or a decision refusing to defer a removal.  Counsel for the 
applicant should be familiar with the legal principles applicable to these 
decisions in order to correctly identify issues that are likely to meet the 
“serious issue” test.  It is beyond the scope of this paper to make an 
exhaustive list of issues that may be raised with respect to H&C and PRRA 
applications as well as with respect to refusals to defer removal; this subject 
is covered more extensively in treatises on substantive immigration law.  
Nevertheless, we will identify the most common issues raised in stay 
motions. 
a) Serious Issue – When Underlying Application is a PRRA 
Decision 
 When an applicant challenges a PRRA decision, very often the 
arguments raised by an applicant pertain to procedural fairness or natural 
justice issues.  In the context of a PRRA application, the legislator specified 
the procedure to be followed by the PRRA officer when examining such an 
application.  In particular, the IRPA and its Regulations contain provisions 
that deal with the type of evidence that can be considered and the 
circumstances calling for an oral hearing. 
                                            
203 Ibid.; see also Streanga v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2007 FC 792 at para. 8 (T.D.). 
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i) Ignoring New Evidence 
 Paragraph 113(a) of the Act contains three categories of admissible 
evidence.  The first category is “new evidence that arose after the rejection” 
of the claim by the Refugee Protection Division.  The second category is 
evidence that “was not reasonably available”.  The third category is evidence 
“that the applicant could not reasonably have been expected to have 
presented”.  Paragraph 113(a) of the IRPA refers to three distinct 
possibilities and these three possibilities must be read disjunctively.204  
Initially, the wording of paragraph 113(a) of the IRPA was supposed to 
contain only the first category that is to say “new evidence that arose after 
the rejection”.  As it appears from the parliamentary debates, the second and 
third categories of evidence were not part of the proposed legislation.  In 
other words, evidence that “was not reasonably available” and “that the 
applicant could not reasonably have been expected to have presented” were 
not destined to be admissible.  They were added at the request of one of the 
members of the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration:   
Ms. Anita Neville: Well, clause 113 currently says that 
the rejected applicant can only present new evidence. 
What I'm proposing is “only new evidence that arose 
after the rejection or was not reasonably available”, 
and then the added words that are important, “or that 
the applicant could not reasonably have been expected 
in the circumstances to have presented”. So that will 
give clarity to the issue of the abused spouse that we 
were talking about.205 
                                            
204 Elezi v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2007 FC 240 at para. 26 (T.D.). 
205 Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, “C-11 an Act Respecting 
Immigration to Canada and the Granting of Refugee Protection to Persons who are 
Displaced, Persecuted or in Danger” in Official Report of Debates (Hansard): 
Evidence, 37th Parliament, 1st Session, Meeting 27, May 17, 2001. 
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 Two schools of thought emerged within the jurisprudence of the 
Federal Court.  The first school of thought was in favour of a more restrictive 
interpretation of paragraph 113(a) of the IRPA.  Indeed, many Federal Court 
cases interpreted paragraph 113(a) of the IRPA quite restrictively.  Some 
judges of the Federal Court were of the view that none of the three categories 
of admissible evidence enunciated in paragraph 113(a) of the Act could relate 
to facts that had already been examined by the RPD.  In other words, in some 
cases it was held that even if the evidence was not reasonably available, it 
could not be adduced before the PRRA officer if it related to incidents or 
events that had already been found not credible by the RPD.  For instance, in 
Perez, Madam Justice Snider reasoned as follows: 
“The purpose of the PRRA  
It is well-established that a PRRA is not intended to be 
an appeal of a decision of the RPD.[…] The decision of 
the RPD is to be considered as final with respect to the 
issue of protection under s. 96 or s. 97 of the 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 
27 (IRPA), subject only to the possibility that new 
evidence demonstrates that the applicant would be 
exposed to a new, different or additional risk that could 
not have been contemplated at the time of the RPD 
decision. Thus, the PRRA Officer is under no obligation 
to assess the alleged risks now identified by the 
Applicant.”206 
 Similarly, in Jaouadi, Mr. Justice Blanchard held that:  
“The PRRA procedure is not an appeal procedure or a 
level of review for IRB decisions. The purpose of the 
PRRA is to assess risks to which a person may be 
subject on removal to his or her country of origin, 
                                            
206 Perez v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2006 FC 1380 at para. 12 (T.D.). 
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based on new facts which may have come to light after 
the decision on the refugee application.”207 
 In the same vein, in Herrada, Mr. Justice Shore ruled that:  
“The only objective of the PRRA program is to assess 
the risks that a person could face if they were to be 
removed to their native country, in light of new facts 
arising after the RPD’s decision on the refugee claim.  
[…] 
Contrary to what is required by the Act, Mr. Salomon 
Herrada and his family simply submitted the same 
allegations in support of their PRRA application as the 
allegations that they presented to the RPD.   
[…] 
Accordingly, when deciding the PRRA application, the 
officer was not entitled to proceed to reassess the 
credibility of Mr. Salomon Herrada and his family or to 
set aside the RPD’s credibility findings. More 
specifically, the PRRA officer could not rely on the fact 
that Mr. Salomon Herrada and his family had been 
targeted by the Shining Path, given the RPD’s findings 
on that issue”.208 
 In Quiroga, Mr. Justice Kellen wrote that “the PRRA application 
cannot be allowed to become a second refugee hearing. It is intended to 
assess new risk developments between a hearing and the removal date. The 
PRRA officer is not to act as a court of appeal from a prior refugee board 
decision.”209 
 The second school of thought is more liberal and allows a broad 
interpretation of paragraph 113(a) of the Act.  Most decisions fall into this 
                                            
207 Jaouadi v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2006 FC 1549 (T.D.). 
208 Herrada v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2006 FC 1004 at paras. 27-32 (T.D.). 
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category.  While these decisions also state that a PRRA officer does not sit on 
appeal or in judicial review, they explicitly recognize that in the presence of 
new evidence, the PRRA officer may disagree with the RPD’s credibility 
findings and may indeed reach a different conclusion.  
The respondent submits that the only purpose of the 
PRRA program is to assess those risks that a person 
could face if they were to be removed to their native 
country, in light of new facts arising after the Refugee 
Board’s decision on the refugee claim. The respondent 
cites a number of cases where the Court has held that 
the PRRA process is not intended to be an appeal of a 
decision of the Refugee Board and that the PRRA is 
designed to assess new risks[…] 
 Although the PRRA process is meant to assess only 
evidence of new risks, this does not mean that new 
evidence relating to old risks need not be considered.210  
 This liberal school of thought prevailed in Raza, where the Federal 
Court of Appeal acknowledged that a PRRA application by a failed refugee 
claimant is not an appeal or reconsideration of the decision of the RPD to 
reject a claim for refugee protection.  However, the Court added that “it may 
[nevertheless] require consideration of some or all of the same factual and 
legal issues as a claim for refugee protection. In such cases there is an 
obvious risk of wasteful and potentially abusive relitigation. The IRPA 
mitigates that risk by limiting the evidence that may be presented to the 
PRRA officer.” 211 
 The Court of Appeal ended its analysis by enumerating questions that 
need to be examined before determining whether a specific piece of evidence 
needs to be considered.  These questions are the following:  
                                            
210 De Silva v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2007 FC 841 at para. 16 (T.D.). 
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1. Credibility: Is the evidence credible, considering its 
source and the circumstances in which it came into 
existence? If not, the evidence need not be considered. 
2.  Relevance: Is the evidence relevant to the PRRA 
application, in the sense that it is capable of proving or 
disproving a fact that is relevant to the claim for 
protection? If not, the evidence need not be considered. 
3.   Newness: Is the evidence new in the sense that it is 
capable of: 
(a)proving the current state of affairs in the country of 
removal or an event that occurred or a circumstance 
that arose after the hearing in the RPD, or 
(b) proving a fact that was unknown to the refugee 
claimant at the time of the RPD hearing, or 
(c) contradicting a finding of fact by the RPD 
(including a credibility finding)? 
If not, the evidence need not be considered. 
4. Materiality: Is the evidence material, in the sense 
that the refugee claim probably would have succeeded 
if the evidence had been made available to the RPD? If 
not, the evidence need not be considered. 
5.  Express statutory conditions: 
(a) If the evidence is capable of proving only an event 
that occurred or circumstances that arose prior to the 
RPD hearing, then has the applicant established either 
that the evidence was not reasonably available to him 
or her for presentation at the RPD hearing, or that he 
or she could not reasonably have been expected in the 
circumstances to have presented the evidence at the 
RPD hearing? If not, the evidence need not be 
considered. 
(b) The evidence is capable of proving an event that 
occurred or circumstances that arose after the RPD 
hearing, then the evidence must be considered (unless 
it is rejected because it is not credible, not relevant, 
not new or not material).212 
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 Raza was an important decision as it clarified the inconsistency 
created by various judges of the Trial Division.  However, we believe this 
decision is a setback in at least one aspect.  In Raza the Federal Court of 
Appeal confirmed that a PRRA application may require an examination of the 
same facts that were raised by the claimant before the RPD.  This finding is a 
setback because it contradicts the principle that “it is not open to the PRRA 
officer to revisit the Board's credibility conclusions” as well as the principle 
that “a PRRA application is not an appeal of the RPD’s credibility findings”.  
Since the PRRA officer may now reach a different credibility finding with 
respect to the same allegations but based on evidence that was not before the 
RPD, he effectively reviews the RPD’s decision with respect to the 
applicant’s credibility.  While a PRRA application may not be an appeal, it is 
definitely a second kick at the can.  
 Nevertheless, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations 
impose an obligation upon the Applicant to explain why the evidence 
submitted with the PRRA application is admissible under subsection 113(a) 
of the IRPA. Subsection 161(2) of the Regulations requires that an applicant 
explain in his or her submissions which evidence meets the requirements of 
paragraph 113(a) of the Act and why it meets them.  In Raza, the Federal 
Court of Appeal acknowledged that without these regulatory requirements, it 
would be easy to reargue unsuccessful asylum claims before a PRRA officer.  
 That said, it is important to define the three prongs of paragraph 
113(a) of the IRPA in light of recent jurisprudential developments.  First, 
with respect to “new evidence”, it is worthwhile pointing out that the mere 
fact that the evidence is dated after the refugee claim hearing does not mean 
that it could not have been prepared sooner or that it is new evidence.  The 
evidence must contain new elements in the sense that they arose subsequent 
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to the hearing before the RPD.213   Second, as to “evidence that was not 
reasonably available to the applicant at the time of the hearing before the 
RPD”, it should be noted that the applicant bears the burden to establish that 
that particular evidence was not reasonably available.214  Consequently, 
absent any proof from the applicant of circumstances that prevented him from 
obtaining this evidence sooner, it does not constitute evidence that was not 
reasonably available to the applicant at the time of the hearing before the 
RPD.215  Similarly, if an applicant is aware of the existence of certain 
evidence but is unable to obtain it before the hearing into his claim for 
asylum because it required research, effort and the cooperation of third 
parties, he might not succeed in filing that evidence in support of his PRRA 
application under the third prong of paragraph 113(a) of the IRPA, i.e., as 
“evidence that the applicant could not have been expected to adduce in the 
circumstances of the case”.  A diligent applicant is expected to request a 
postponement of his RPD hearing in order to gather all relevant documents in 
support of his claim.216  If he fails to do so, he will be unable to file such 
evidence at the PRRA stage. 
ii) Relying on Extrinsic Evidence 
 Generally, the rules of procedural equity require that the 
administrative board or the decision-maker disclose the evidence that is 
adverse to the applicant in order to give him or her an adequate opportunity 
to respond.  Obviously, this rule applies to extrinsic evidence only; therefore, 
the evidence need not be brought to the applicant’s attention if he or she is 
aware of it.  An applicant is deemed to know from his past experience with 
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the refugee process what type of evidence of general country conditions the 
immigration officer will be relying on and where to find that evidence; 
consequently, fairness does not dictate that he be informed of what is 
available to him in documentation centers of the Immigration and Refugee 
Board.217  Procedural equity requires an immigration officer who intends to 
rely on evidence which is not normally found, or was not available at the time 
the applicant filed his submissions, in documentation centers, to inform the 
applicant of novel and significant information which evidences a change in 
the general country conditions that may affect the disposition of the case.218 
 In other words, an immigration officer will violate a rule of 
procedural fairness if he relies on extrinsic evidence without providing the 
applicant an opportunity to respond and if the evidence relied on contains 
novel and significant information which evidences a change in the general 
country conditions.  It is logical because an officer may rely on a new 
country report simply because the old version is no longer available.  There 
will be no violation of procedural equity if the information contained in the 
new report is the same as the one found in the older version. 
 In Fi,219 Zamora,220 and Radji,221 the Federal Court cautioned the 
PRRA officers against using documentation or sources taken from non-
standard websites and that are not available at the IRB Documentation 
Centers. Consequently, a serious issue will be raised in a motion for a stay of 
removal if an applicant establishes all of the following elements: (1) the 
PRRA officer relied on extrinsic evidence; (2) the PRRA officer did not give 
                                            
217 Mancia v. Canada (M.C.I.), 1998 CanLII 9066 (F.C.A.), [1998] 3 F.C. 461, at 
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218 Ibid. at para. 23. 
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him an opportunity to respond to this evidence; (3) the evidence contains 
novel and significant information evidencing changes in the general country 
conditions; (4) the evidence was not available in the IRB’s documentation 
centres and it is not the type of evidence that the applicant can anticipate that 
the PRRA officer would rely on. 
iii) Holding a Hearing 
 Paragraph 113(b) of the IRPA provides that a PRRA officer may hold 
a hearing if, on the basis of certain prescribed factors, the Minister is of the 
opinion that a hearing should be held. For the purpose of determining whether 
a hearing is required under paragraph 113(b) of the IRPA, section 167 of the 
IRPA Regulations set out the factors to be considered.  These factors are the 
following: (a) whether there is evidence that raises a serious issue of the 
applicant's credibility and is related to the factors set out in sections 96 and 
97 of the Act; (b) whether the evidence is central to the decision with respect 
to the application for protection; and (c) whether the evidence, if accepted, 
would justify allowing the application for protection. If all the requirements 
of that section are met, then the PRRA Officer should hold a hearing.222 
 With respect to the first criterion, the immigration officer may 
conclude that the applicant’s credibility is not in issue, but nevertheless 
dismiss the PRRA application on the basis of insufficiency of evidence.223  
While it is true that the lack of evidence or the probative value of evidence 
and credibility are two separate and distinct reasons for dismissing one’s 
claim for asylum,224 immigration officers should not disguise credibility 
                                            
222 Ferguson v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2008 FC 1067 at para. 8 (T.D.). 
223 Jiang v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2009 FC 794 at para. 11-13 (T.D.); C.D. v. Canada 
(M.C.I.), 2008 FC 501 at para. 39. 
224 See e.g. Ferguson, supra note 221; Alexis c. Canada (M.C.I.), 2008 CF 273 
(T.D.); Kaba c. Canada (M.C.I.), 2006 CF 1113 (T.D.); Selliah c. Canada (M.C.I.), 
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findings as lack of evidence or as absence of probative value in order to 
justify their refusal to hold a hearing.   With respect to the second and third 
criteria set out in section 167 of IRPR, the evidence related to the applicant’s 
credibility must be central and decisive.  It would not be central if it concerns 
an irrelevant fact.  It would not be decisive if the claim would fail anyway on 
grounds unrelated to the applicant’s credibility.  For instance, if the PRRA 
officer found that the applicant could avail himself of state protection in his 
home country, then the applicant’s credibility would no longer be decisive. 
iv) Removal to Country Described in Section 230 of the 
Regulations 
 Section 230 of IRPR allows the Minister to impose a stay on removal 
orders with respect to a country if the circumstances in that country pose a 
generalized risk to the entire civilian population as a result of an armed 
conflict within the country or place, an environmental disaster resulting in a 
substantial temporary disruption of living conditions or any situation that is 
temporary and generalized.  Removals were stayed to Burundi, Liberia, 
Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo because of civil wars and 
armed conflicts. Removals to Sri Lanka were stayed during the Tsunami.  
Removals to Haiti were stayed as a result of the chaotic political situation in 
the country and later as a result of the devastating earthquake. The Minister 
of Citizenship and Immigration has a list of countries for which a temporary 
suspension of removals has been imposed.  The Minister periodically reviews 
this list and cancels the stay if the circumstances in the country no longer 
pose a generalized risk to the entire civilian population.225 
 However, this stay does not apply to a person who is inadmissible on 
security grounds, on grounds of violating human or international rights, on 
grounds of criminality, or to a person referred to in section F of Article 1 of 
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the Convention relating to the Refugee Status.226  When examining the PRRA 
application of a person who will be removed to a country mentioned on the 
Minister’s list of temporary suspension of removals, but to whom this 
suspension does not apply because of subsection 230(3) of the IRPR, the 
PRRA officer has nevertheless the duty to comment on the reasons for the 
temporary suspension of removals to that country and distinguish the specific 
facts of the case being studied.227 
 In the Isomi and Alexis cases, the Federal Court explained that even 
when the temporary suspension of removals does not apply to an applicant, 
the mere existence of such a suspension of removals gives rise to a 
disconcerting factual situation which must be taken into consideration in 
studying the PRRA.  The reasons for suspending removals to a particular 
country could be useful for the purposes of examining the risks of return of 
an applicant. Consequently, a PRRA officer’s failure to make such an 
analysis raises a serious issue under the Toth test. 
b) Serious Issue – When the Underlying Application is an 
H&C Decision 
 When the underlying proceeding to a stay motion is a judicial review 
application of a decision refusing a permanent residence application based on 
humanitarian and compassionate grounds, the questions that are most 
frequently raised on a stay motion relate to the procedural fairness, to the 
best interests of a child, to lengthy delays of processing and to the risks of 
return.  In this section, we will not consider the issue of risks of return since 
we have already covered this topic in the previous section.   
                                            
226 Ibid, s. 230(3). 
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i) Procedural Fairness 
 An applicant bears the burden of bringing to the officer’s attention 
any evidence relevant to humanitarian and compassionate considerations.228  
The officer is neither required to contact the applicant to obtain all 
information necessary to render an appropriate decision229 nor to allow the 
Applicant to complete his evidence.230  Similarly, an officer has no duty to 
contact the applicant and request an update even when an application has 
been pending for many months; in such cases, the courts have held that an 
applicant may constantly update his file throughout the process before the 
decision is rendered.231  In Krishnan,232 the Federal Court refused to certify 
the following question: 
Does the duty of fairness require that the Minister’s 
delegate either make herself aware of the conditions in the 
applicant’s country of origin, through publicly available 
human rights reports and other such material, at the time 
of making a decision [...] or give notice to the applicant 
that a decision will shortly be made and invite the 
applicant to provide updated information on the 
conditions in the country of origin, where a significant 
period has passed since the applicant’s case was perfected 
for consideration without a decision having been made? 
                                            
228 Owusu v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2003 FCT 94, [2003] F.C.J. No. 139, aff’d 
2004 FCA 38, [2004] F.C.J. No. 158 (F.C.A.). 
229 Nguyen v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2005 FC 236, [2005] F.C.J. No. 281 (T.D.); Aoutlev 
v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2007 FC 111 (T.D.) [Aoutlev]; Irias v. Canada (M.C.I.), 
2003 FC 1321, [2003] F.C.J. No. 1717 (T.D.); Patel v. Canada (M.C.I.), [1997] 
F.C.J. No. 54 (T.D.). 
230 Samsonov v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2006 FC 1158, [2006] F.C.J. No. 1457 (T.D.). 
231 Melchor v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2004 FC 1327, [2004] F.C.J. No. 1600 at paras. 14-
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 In refusing to certify this question, the Court followed previous 
decisions where it was held that an applicant has the responsibility to put 
before the decision-maker all the material that he or she wishes to have 
considered and he or she can submit further evidence until the final decision 
is rendered.  The only difficulty with this reasoning is that an applicant 
cannot know when the decision is about to be rendered.  Therefore, he is 
expected to constantly verify the documentary evidence and send updates to 
the immigration officer.  Such a burden seems to be excessive compared with 
the little effort it would require an officer to inform the applicant by a 
standard letter that a decision is about to be rendered and to invite him to 
submit updated information. 
 An interview is not a general requirement in the case of decisions 
regarding applications based on humanitarian and compassionate 
considerations, and offering applicants a chance to make their submissions in 
writing satisfies the requirements of procedural fairness.233  However, the 
officer has a duty to take into account all of the relevant information 
submitted by an applicant, including any new information relating to risks of 
return which was not analyzed by a PRRA officer.234  In addition, an officer 
must provide adequate reasons for the decision.  When assessing the 
adequacy of reasons, those reasons must not be held to a standard of 
perfection or read microscopically: 
[…] a reviewing court should be realistic in determining 
if a tribunal’s reasons meet the legal standard of 
adequacy. Reasons should be read in their entirety, not 
parsed closely, clause-by-clause, for possible errors or 
                                            
233 Baker, supra note 99, at 843; Étienne v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2003 FC 1314, [2003] 
F.C.J. No. 1659 (T.D.); Duplessis c. Canada (M.C.I.), 2006 CF 1190 at para. 37 
(T.D.); Bouaraoudj v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2006 FC 1530, [2006] F.C.J. No. 1918 at 
para. 17-21 (T.D.); Aoutlev, supra note 228 at para. 10. 
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omissions; they should be read with a view to 
understanding, not puzzling over every possible 
inconsistency, ambiguity or infelicity of expression.235 
 Rather, in assessing the adequacy of the reasons provided, a 
reviewing Court must examine the overall reasoning process contained in a 
decision.236  A related consideration is whether or not relevant evidence was 
ignored in the officer’s assessment.  Although the officer, as is the case with 
any other administrative board, is presumed to have considered all 
documentary evidence that was before it,237 and although the officer’s failure 
to mention some of the documentary evidence is not fatal to the decision,238 
an erroneous finding of fact can be inferred from the officer’s failure to 
mention in his reasons some evidence before him that was relevant to the 
finding, and that pointed to a different conclusion from that reached by 
him.239 
ii) Best Interests of a Child 
 The best interests of the child is an important factor that must be 
given substantial weight when assessing a permanent resident application 
based on humanitarian and compassionate grounds.240 The immigration 
                                            
235 Ragupathy v Canada (M.C.I.), 2006 FCA 151, [2006] F.C.J. No. 654 at para. 15 
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officer must be “alert, alive and sensitive” to these interests.241  In Kolosovs, 
the Federal Court defined these three terms as follows: 
The word alert implies awareness. When an H&C 
application indicates that a child who will be directly 
affected by the decision, a visa officer must demonstrate 
an awareness of the child’s best interests by noting the 
ways in which those interests are implicated. [...]  Once 
an officer is aware of the best interest factors in play in 
an H&C application, these factors must be considered in 
their full context and the relationship between the factors 
and other elements of the fact scenario concerned must be 
fully understood. Simply listing the best interest factors in 
play without providing an analysis on their inter-
relationship is not being alive to the factors. In my 
opinion, in order to be alive to a child’s best interests, it 
is necessary for a visa officer to demonstrate that he or 
she well understands the perspective of each of the 
participants in a given fact scenario, including the child if 
this can reasonably determined. [...]It is only after a visa 
officer has gained a full understanding of the real life 
impact of a negative H&C decision on the best interests of 
a child can the officer give those best interests sensitive 
consideration. To demonstrate sensitivity, the officer must 
be able to clearly articulate the suffering of a child that 
will result from a negative decision, and then say whether, 
together with a consideration of other factors, the 
suffering warrants humanitarian and compassionate 
relief.242 
 In our view, in Kolosovs, by defining the terms “alert, alive and 
sensitive”, the Court added formal requirements and complicated an 
immigration officer’s task.  The Trial Division did precisely what the Federal 
Court of Appeal cautioned against doing: 
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The administrative burden facing officers in humanitarian 
and compassionate assessments--as is illustrated by 
section 8.5 of Chapter IP 5 of the Immigration Manual: 
Inland Processing (IP) reproduced at paragraph 30 of my 
colleague's reasons-- is demanding enough without adding 
to it formal requirements as to the words to be used or the 
approach to be followed in their description and analysis 
of the relevant facts and factors.243 
 Although the best interests of a child are an important factor, they are 
not more important than other factors: 
Baker does not create a prima facie presumption that the 
children's best interests should prevail, subject only to the 
gravest countervailing grounds. In his question, Justice 
Nadon refers to the "children's best interests". This 
expression is oftentimes encountered in Baker, but to the 
extent that it could be understood to mean that the 
interests of the children are superior to other interests, it 
can cause the agent to believe that this factor is, before 
all others, more important, which in light of Suresh and in 
the absence of clear legislative or regulatory limitations 
stating otherwise, cannot be the case. It would be better to 
use the expression "children's interests".244 
 The children’s interests are especially not decisive of the issue of 
removal.245  The presence of children in Canada does not constitute in itself 
an impediment to the removal of a parent illegally residing in Canada.246  The 
officer’s assessment of the best interests of the child does not consist of 
determining whether the child’s best interests favour non-removal because 
such a determination would inevitably lead to the conclusion that removal is 
                                            
243 Hawthorne v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2002 FCA 475, [2003] 2 F.C. 555, 222 D.L.R. 
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244 Legault, supra note 239 at para. 13. 
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prohibited in all but a very few unusual cases.247 “The officer's task is to 
determine, in the circumstances of each case, the likely degree of hardship to 
the child caused by the removal of the parent and to weigh this degree of 
hardship together with other factors, including public policy considerations 
that militate in favor of or against the removal of the parent.”248  The officer 
is not required to assess whether the damage to the child's interests is 
disproportionate to the public benefit produced by the decision.249 
 The officer must clearly identify and define the best interests of a 
child.250  However, the officer is not required to specifically identify the 
obvious disadvantages faced by children as such a requirement “would 
elevate form over substance”.251 Also, the obligation to consider the best 
interests of a child only arises when it is sufficiently clear from the material 
submitted to the decision-maker that an application relies in whole, or at least 
in part, on this factor.252 In other words, the officer’s analysis of the best 
interests of the child should be proportionate to the applicant’s submissions 
on this point.253  If an applicant provides insufficient evidence to support the 
claim, the officer may conclude that it is baseless. 
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 In certain decisions, the Court has extended the application of the 
notion “best interests of a child” to adult children.254  We strongly disagree 
with these decisions.   
 An officer was held not to be alert, alive and sensitive to the child’s 
best interests when he summarily dismissed the child's concerns and ignored 
the financial implications for the child of her mother's removal.255  Similarly, 
an officer was held not to be alert, alive and sensitive to the child’s best 
interests when his analysis “lacked substance and any real basis for the 
Officer’s disagreement with the advice and conclusions contained in the 
psychological reports”.256  Also, an officer is not alert, alive and sensitive to 
the best interests of a child when he simply lists these best interests without 
conducting a meaningful analysis, particularly when he has before him 
evidence “that the children’s educational aspirations would be significantly 
damaged if forced to leave Canada”.257 In Yoo,258 the Federal Court granted 
the judicial review application challenging an H&C where the officer failed 
to assess the potential impact of the interruption in the adult child’s 
education. 
iii) Undue Delay 
 Processing an application for permanent residence based on H&C 
grounds may take several years.  Applicants whose H&C application has been 
pending for several months or years may seek from the Federal Court an 
order of mandamus pursuant to subparagraph 18(1)(3)(a) of the Federal 
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Courts Act.259 A mandamus application may result in an order forcing the 
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration to render a decision on the H&C 
application that it failed or refused to render or has unreasonably delayed. 
 In Apotex,260 the Federal Court of Appeal conducted an extensive 
analysis of the jurisprudence and concluded that to issue a writ of mandamus,  
the following conditions need to be satisfied:  
(a) there must be a public legal duty to act; 
(b) the duty must be owed to the applicant; 
(c) there is a clear right to performance of that duty: 
(i) there was a prior demand for performance of the duty; 
(ii) there was a reasonable time to comply with the demand 
unless refused outright; 
(iii) there was a subsequent refusal to perform the duty which 
can be either expressed or implied, e.g. unreasonable 
delay. 
(d) Where the duty sought to be enforced is discretionary, the 
following rules apply: 
(i) in exercising his or her discretion, the decision-maker 
must not act in a manner which can be characterized as 
"unfair", "oppressive" or demonstrate "flagrant 
impropriety" or "bad faith"; 
                                            
259 Supra note 7. 
260 Apotex Inc. v. Canada (A.G.), [1994] 1 F.C. 742, 51 C.P.R. (3d) 339, 18 Admin. 
L.R. (2d) 122, 69 F.T.R. 152 (F.C.A.) [Apotex], aff’d 1994 SCC 47, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 
1100, 59 C.P.R. (3d) 82, 29 Admin. L.R. (2d) 1 (S.C.C.). 
 
 
 
…/90
(ii) mandamus is unavailable if the decision-maker's 
discretion is characterized as being "unqualified", 
"absolute", "permissive" or "unfettered"; 
(iii) in the exercise of "fettered" discretion, the decision-
maker must act upon "relevant", as opposed to 
"irrelevant", considerations; 
(iv) mandamus is unavailable to compel the exercise of 
"fettered discretion" in a particular way; 
(v) mandamus is only available when the decision-maker's 
discretion is "spent"; i.e., the applicant has a vested right 
to the performance of the duty. 
(e) No other adequate remedy is available to the applicant; 
(f) The order sought will be of some practical value or effect; 
(g) The Court in the exercise of its discretion finds no equitable bar 
to the relief sought; 
(h) On a "balance of convenience", an order in the nature of 
mandamus should (or should not) be issued. 
 In the vast majority of immigration cases where a mandamus order is 
sought, the decisive issue concerns the third factor – clear right to the 
performance of the duty – and in particular, the reasonableness of the 
delay.261  While each application for mandamus must turn on its own factual 
context,262 the jurisprudence provides some guidance in terms of what may 
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constitute unreasonable delay in processing an H&C application.  A delay of 
24 months is usually considered a normal timeframe for processing an H&C 
decision whereas a delay of 36 months without a reasonable explanation has 
been held to be excessive.263 
c) Serious Issue – When the Underlying Application is a 
Refusal to Defer a Removal 
 As mentioned previously, the Act contains no reference to removals 
officers, enforcement officers or expulsion officers.  Yet, the Federal Court 
found in the wording of section 48 of the former Immigration Act, which is 
the equivalent of subsection 48(2) of the IRPA, the power enabling removals 
officers to defer a foreign national’s removal from Canada.  The first case to 
recognize such power was Poyanipur.264  Since then, several important 
decisions were rendered by the Federal Court where the scope of a removals 
officer’s discretion was thoroughly examined.  The Courts have attempted to 
define in these decisions the scope of a removals officer’s discretion to defer 
a removal.   
 The case law is unanimous – an enforcement officer’s discretion to 
defer removal is limited.265  In Wang,266 the Federal Court circumscribed the 
boundaries of an enforcement officer’s discretion to defer a person’s removal.  
It was held that an officer may take into account a range of factors in 
determining the timing of the removal.  These factors are mainly related to 
making effective travel arrangements.  Consequently, any circumstance or 
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factor that may affect these arrangements, such as children’s school years, 
pending births or deaths or poor medical condition of the person to be 
removed, may influence the officer’s decision as to the timing of the person’s 
removal.  
 In addition to these factors, the most recent jurisprudence of the 
Federal Court also instructs that in the exercise of his discretion a removal 
officer may consider the best interests of a child267 and the existence of a 
pending H&C application that was filed in a timely manner.268  An applicant 
has the onus to provide the evidence justifying a deferral and an officer is not 
required to investigate matters to see whether or not deferral is warranted.269 
i) Duty to Render a Decision 
 The Federal Court considers the removals officer’s exercise of 
discretion as a decision-rendering process.270  Therefore, a removals officer 
must render a decision on a request to defer a removal.  However, a removals 
officer must be afforded a reasonable time period to deal with the request.271   
In most cases, a delay of four days does not constitute a reasonable period of 
time.272  Conversely, if a removal officer does not respond to a deferral 
request within a reasonable period of time, this failure in itself may, and in 
our view should, raise a serious issue. 
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ii) Inadequate Reasons 
 In the absence of a legislative provision specifying the form decisions 
must take, there is no required format for decisions.273  A decision can be oral 
or written.274  Thus, theoretically, a removals officer has no duty to provide a 
written decision.  In practice, however, officers send a standardized letter 
wherein they inform the applicant that they considered his or her request to 
defer, but did not think that it was justified in the circumstances. These types 
of letters were held to be sufficient in many recent decisions of the Federal 
Court.275 
 Applicants should always strive to make their request to defer 
removal in writing.  It may be difficult to prove that an oral request was made 
and it will be especially difficult to establish the contents of such a request. 
Moreover, a written request is more likely to culminate in a written response. 
By the same token, communicating a decision orally, especially through the 
telephone, may be problematic.  In Hinson,276 the Court refused to recognize 
a simple telephone call as a decision, in response to a written inquiry, from a 
departmental official in which the immigration officer advised the applicant 
that his request for admission to Canada on humanitarian and compassionate 
grounds had been granted.  Following this telephone call, Hinson received a 
letter denying his H&C application.  The Court explained that given the 
repercussions of such a decision on an applicant, a simple telephone call 
could not be a final determination of an application and consequently was not 
a reviewable decision.  A removals officer’s decision also has important 
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repercussions on an applicant.  If a removals officer decides to inform the 
applicant of his decision by telephone, the applicant may find himself in a 
difficult situation in case he decides to seek a judicial review of that decision 
because the Courts may follow the Hinson case and not view a telephone call 
as a reviewable decision.   
 In our view, a refusal to defer removal communicated orally will 
raise a serious issue as soon as the applicant alleges that the removals officer 
ignored certain allegations, misconstrued or misunderstood the evidence, and 
so on.  Therefore, we cannot insist enough on the importance of providing 
adequate reasons in support of a refusal to defer removal.   
 In many cases, the Federal Court has ruled that no formal decision is 
mandated in the legislation or regulations to defer removal,277 and that before 
refusing the request, an officer must at least acknowledge that he has some 
discretion to defer removal.278  This however does not mean that the complete 
absence of reasons is looked on with a favourable eye.  As mentioned 
previously, to the extent that it is practical to do so, an agency must always 
strive to provide reasons for its decision.279  The Supreme Court of Canada 
outlined a number of purposes that reasons may serve.280  The courts 
constantly urge removal officers to take notes.281  In Boniowski, the Court 
explained that the recording of written notes which set out the reasons for an 
administrative decision fosters better decision-making, and provides a basis 
of explanation if such decision is challenged on judicial review.  The officer 
is not required to draft well-written, formal reasons.  His hand-written notes 
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may constitute reasons for the decision.282 As stated by the Court in 
Adomako: 
Removal officers have limited discretion and accordingly, 
the reasons for decision are often sparse and not as well 
written as one might wish. They have to be read in their 
totality; rather than focusing on a single sentence and 
reading it too literally. In this case, after looking at the 
entire decision, it becomes clear that the removal officer 
was aware of the total situation and took all of the relevant 
factors into account.283 
 Furthermore, an officer is not required to communicate his notes to 
the applicant unless a specific request is made. If the applicant fails to 
request the officer's reasons or her notes to file, he will be barred from 
raising this issue in a motion for a stay of removal before the Federal 
Court.284   
 A serious issue was found in the Thomas and Guizar cases where the 
officer either refused to communicate his notes or imposed upon the applicant 
additional steps in order to obtain these notes.285  In Thomas the applicant 
requested reasons for the removals officer’s decision refusing to defer 
removal.  The removals officer denied the request indicating that such a 
request for reasons "must be made through the privacy coordinator." The 
Court held that this reply raised a serious issue and granted the stay.   
 The vast majority of cases state that even the complete absence of 
written reasons from a removal officer is not, in and of itself, a reason for the 
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reviewing Court to intervene.286  There is however a number of judges who 
disagree with this reasoning.  For instance, in Man, the Court stated in an 
obiter that a complete absence of reasons raises a serious issue: 
Notwithstanding the decision of the Court in Hailu v. 
Canada (Solicitor General), 2005 FC 229 (where no 
question was certified), with great respect, I would likely 
have concluded that a serious issue arose from the 
absence of any explanation anywhere for the decision not 
to defer removal (i.e. whether contained in the officer's 
notes, in the decision letter or by affidavit). This Court 
has held that a refusal of deferral may carry profound 
implications for the person concerned. (See, for example, 
Thomas v. Canada (M.C.I.) 2003 F.C. 1477). Accordingly, 
I wish to underscore the Court's comments in Boniowski v. 
Canada (M.C.I.), 2004 FC 1161 that the respondent 
minister should "encourage" as a regular practice the 
keeping of notes by removals officers with respect to the 
exercise of their discretion whether to defer removal. Such 
notes fulfill any reasons requirement and would allow the 
Court to consider allegations of bias, fettering of 
discretion, breach of principles of fairness and the like. 
The absence of any note, affidavit or meaningful statement 
in a decision letter as to why deferral was refused should 
not, in my view, be allowed to immunize from effective 
judicial review the exercise of an, albeit limited, 
discretion.287 
iii) Medical Impediments to Travel 
 Some individuals with medical conditions who are facing removal 
may claim that adequate medical facilities and/or treatment are not available 
or accessible in their destination country. A removal officer has to consider 
these medical factors when determining the timing of the removal.  Removal 
officers often rely on the expertise of the medical officers employed by the 
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Health Management Branch of Citizenship and Immigration Canada.288  The 
Health Management Branch is a centralized unit that, upon request, will 
provide a medical opinion on the medical facilities, treatment and services 
available in the destination country.289   
 When medical reasons are raised in support of a request for a 
deferral, the officer should refer these reasons to the Health Management 
Branch and solicit an opinion on these allegations from a medical officer.  
The failure to consult a medical officer or an attempt to interpret a medical 
report may raise a serious issue since a removal officer has no medical 
expertise.290  Needless to say, an officer is not required to obtain an 
additional medical opinion if the file already contains conclusions from 
medical officers which contradict the medical certificate filed by the 
applicant.   
 In any event, a medical opinion being extrinsic evidence must be 
communicated to the applicant.   
I interpret the term “extrinsic evidence not brought 
forward by the applicant” as evidence of which the 
applicant is unaware because it comes from an outside 
source. This would be evidence of which the applicant has 
no knowledge and on which the immigration officer intends 
to rely in making a decision affecting the applicant.291 
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 Therefore, the Courts held in certain cases that the removals officer 
should provide the applicant with an opportunity to respond to this opinion.292  
However, in Holubova,293 the Court warned that “the deferral request and the 
stay [motion] is not the forum for dueling medical opinions, rebuttal, reply, 
sur-rebuttal and sur-reply.” 
 The removal officer’s reliance on a medical opinion from the Health 
Management Branch does not shelter his decision from judicial scrutiny 
because it may be apparent from the medical opinion obtained that the 
medical officer disregarded an essential element such as costs of treatment294 
or accessibility of certain medical services295 in the country of destination. 
iv) A Second PRRA Application 
 A person who receives a negative PRRA decision and who remains in 
Canada may make another application. Pursuant to section 165 of IRPR, a 
subsequent PRRA application does not result in a statutory stay of removal.  
Thus, removal arrangements can proceed. In exceptional circumstances, a 
stay of removal may be warranted.296  A lengthy period of time since the first 
PRRA application would, in our opinion, constitute exceptional 
circumstances and would justify a deferral or an administrative stay.  If such 
a stay is denied, then the courts should grant a judicial stay to an applicant. 
 Should the immigration authorities grant a stay to an applicant who 
alleges to have discovered evidence that would be crucial to his subsequent 
application?  The answer to this question depends, in our view, on the nature 
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of this allegation and on the trustworthiness of an applicant based on his 
overall credibility before various immigration boards and decision-makers.  If 
the applicant has been found not credible by the Immigration and Refugee 
Board as well as by the PRRA officer who dismissed his first application, and 
he or she now attempts to adduce new evidence relating to the same 
allegations which were found not to be credible, then the applicant is most 
probably trying to buy more time in Canada and does not deserve a stay of 
removal.  Conversely, if the applicant has never claimed asylum in Canada 
and his PRRA application was dismissed on grounds of insufficiency of 
evidence, then the removal officer should seriously consider the applicant’s 
request for a deferral of his removal. 
v) Pending H&C Application 
 Generally, a pending H&C application does not constitute grounds 
for deferring a removal that has become enforceable.297  However, the Federal 
Court held on numerous occasions that an enforcement officer has a duty to 
take into account a pending H&C application that has been filed in a timely 
fashion.298  A pending H&C will be considered as filed in a timely fashion if 
it meets the following two criteria.   
 First, a timely application is not an application that was filed for the 
sole purpose of obtaining a deferral or a stay of removal.    Generally, an 
H&C application that is filed after the applicant’s removal becomes 
enforceable should not be considered as timely.  For instance, an H&C 
application filed after a negative PRRA decision was rendered should not be 
considered an application filed in a timely manner:  
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The existence of a pending H&C application has often 
been held not to constitute irreparable harm, especially 
when, as here, the application was not made in timely 
fashion after unsuccessful applications for refugee status 
and a PRRA. Counsel says that it was justifiable for them 
to wait five years before making their H&C application so 
that they could demonstrate establishment in Canada. This 
was a tactical decision and the appellants must live with 
the consequences.299 
 Second, a timely H&C application also requires that it be pending for 
a sufficiently long period of time.  More specifically, in determining whether 
an application was filed in a timely manner, the enforcement officer should 
consider whether the reason there was no decision was a backlog in the 
system.300   
 As a rule of thumb, an application that has been pending for more 
than 12 months will be considered as timely.  In more recent cases,301 the 
Federal Court held that there was no duty on the enforcement officer to defer 
removal pending determination of the H&C application filed approximately 
10 months before.  Inversely, in several other decisions, the Federal Court 
held that a serious issue is raised by an enforcement officer’s failure to 
consider an outstanding H&C application that has been pending for more than 
13 months.302   
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 Even though in some decisions the Federal Court found that a serious 
issue was raised by the enforcement officer’s failure to consider an H&C 
application that had been pending for only four303 or eight months,304 we 
believe that this approach is unrealistic.   
vi) Best Interests of a Child 
 It is now settled law that the removals officer has a duty to consider 
the best interests of a child.  It is essential for the removals officer to make it 
clear either in his notes or, in their absence, in the decision itself, that he took 
into consideration the best interests of the children.  Ideally, the officer 
would go one step further and briefly explain why the interests of the child 
were insufficient to warrant a deferral.  In Munar, the Federal Court 
described the scope and the extent of the removal officer’s obligation to take 
into account the best interests of a child.  In doing so, the Court compared 
this obligation to that of an H&C officer: 
[39]When assessing an H&C application, the immigration 
officer must weigh the long term best interests of the child. 
[…] Factors related to the emotional, social, cultural and 
physical well-being of the child are to be taken into 
consideration. Examples of factors that can be taken into 
account include the age of the child, the level of 
dependency between the child and the H&C applicant, the 
degree of the child’s establishment in Canada, the child’s 
links to the country in relation to which the H&C decision 
is being considered, the medical issues or special needs 
the child may have, the impact to the child’s education, 
and matters related to the child’s gender. […] 
 [40]This is obviously not the kind of assessment that the 
removal officer is expected to undertake when deciding 
whether the enforcement of the removal order is 
“reasonably practicable.” What he should be considering, 
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however, are the short-term best interests of the child. For 
example, it is certainly within the removal officer’s 
discretion to defer removal until a child has terminated his 
or her school year, if he or she is going with his or her 
parent. Similarly, I cannot bring myself to the conclusion 
that the removal officer should not satisfy himself that 
provisions have been made for leaving a child in the care 
of others in Canada when parents are to be removed. This 
is clearly within his mandate, if section 48 of the IRPA is 
to be read consistently with the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child. To make enquiries as to whether a child will 
be adequately looked after does not amount to a fulsome 
H&C assessment and in no way duplicates the role of the 
immigration officer who will eventually deal with such an 
application (see Boniowski v. Canada (Minister of 
Citizenship and Immigration) (2004), 44 Imm. L.R. (3d) 31 
(F.C.)).305 
 Since the Federal Court’s decision in Munar, it is now clear that 
although a removal officer need not conduct a mini H&C assessment, he has 
an obligation to consider the short-term interests of a child affected by a 
removal.  Thus, a failure to consider this factor will raise a serious issue. 
vii) Spouse in Canada Public Policy 
 The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration has determined that it is 
in the public interest to assess all foreign nationals in spousal or common-law 
relationships with Canadian citizens or permanent residents, regardless of 
status of their immigration status, under the provisions of the Spouse or 
Common-law Partner in Canada class, if they meet the following conditions: 
(1) they have made an application for permanent residence either on H&C 
grounds or via the Spouse or Common-law Partner in Canada class; (2) they 
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are the subjects of a sponsorship undertaking that is made by their spouse or 
common-law partner.306 
 Accordingly, this policy exempts the foreign national from the 
requirement of having legal status in Canada for the purposes of applying for 
a permanent resident status in the spouse or common-law partner category.307  
This policy would have very little practical effect if the foreign national 
could be removed by the Canada Border Services Agency of the Department 
of Public Safety while his application for permanent residence is being 
processed.  Consequently, the Canada Border Services Agency has agreed to 
grant a temporary administrative deferral of removal to applicants who 
qualify under this public policy. However, to benefit from this deferral, the 
foreign national should not be inadmissible for security, human or 
international rights violations, serious or organized criminality and 
criminality or be excluded under Article 1F of the Geneva Convention 
relating to Refugee Status by the Refugee Protection Division of the 
Immigration and Refugee Board.308  In addition, the foreign national will not 
benefit from this deferral if he has an outstanding warrant for removal, or if 
he has previously hindered removal.309 
 Applicants who apply under this public policy after they are deemed 
removal ready by the Canada Border Services Agency will not benefit from 
the administrative deferral of removal.  For the purposes of this public policy, 
by the time an applicant attends a pre-removal interview, the foreign national 
is generally removal ready. This means that a person who has been called to a 
pre-removal interview by any means (letter, call, etc.) and who has not 
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already applied as a spousal H&C applicant or a Spouse or Common-law 
Partner in Canada class applicant, cannot, from the point they are called to 
the interview onwards, benefit from an administrative deferral of removal as 
outlined in this public policy.310  This exception was introduced in order to 
avoid abuse or deferrals based on fraudulent applications. 
d) Serious Issue – When Underlying Application is an Order 
to Release a Detained Person  
 Subsection 55(2) of IRPA provides that an officer may, without a 
warrant, arrest and detain a foreign national, other than a protected person, 
who the officer has reasonable grounds to believe is a danger to the public or 
is unlikely to appear for an examination, admissibility hearing, removal from 
Canada, or at a proceeding that could lead to the making of a removal order.  
This provision also allows the officer to detain a person if he is not satisfied 
of the person’s identity. 
 Immediately after taking a person into detention, an officer must give 
notice to the Immigration Division.311  Within 48 hours after a person is taken 
into detention, the Immigration Division must review the reasons for the 
continued detention.312  Further detention reviews take place within seven 
days following the first detention review, and once during each 30-day period 
following each previous review.313 
 Pursuant to section 58 of IRPA, the Immigration Division shall order 
continued detention when satisfied that the person detained is a danger to the 
public, is unlikely to appear or his identity has not been established. The 
                                            
310 Ibid.; Lubisa Jovic v. (Canada) M.P.S.E.P. 2007 FC 748 (T.D.); Wraich v. 
Canada (M.P.S.E.P), 30 November 2006, Imm-6194-06, de Montigny J. (T.D.). 
311 IRPA, supra note 5, s. 55(4). 
312 Ibid. s. 57(1). 
313 Ibid. s. 57(2). 
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Minister bears the initial burden of establishing that the continued detention 
is warranted.314 The evidentiary burden shifts to the detainee once the 
Minister has established a prima facie case.315  
 The factors to be taken into consideration when assessing the 
detention or the release of a person who is either unlikely to appear for an 
examination, admissibility hearing, removal from Canada, or at a proceeding 
that could lead to the making of a removal order, is set out in section 245 of 
IRPR.  The factors to be taken into consideration when assessing the 
detention or the release of a person who is a danger to the public, or whose 
identity has not been established, are set out in sections 246 and 247 of IRPR. 
 When the Board decides to order the person’s release, the Minister of 
Public Safety might challenge this decision before the Federal Court by way 
of judicial review. However, the release order is effective immediately;316 
therefore, by the time the judicial review application is disposed of, the 
points in issue will become moot.  To prevent the foreign national’s release 
from detention before the disposition of the judicial review, the Crown (the 
Minister of Public Safety) will seek an order from the Federal Court 
requesting that the individual’s release be stayed pending the final disposition 
of the judicial review application. 
 To obtain a stay of the Immigration Division’s order to release a 
detained person, the Minister must meet the tri-partite test applicable to all 
stay motions.  The threshold of a serious issue is low: it is sufficient to prove 
that the issue raised by the Minister is not frivolous or vexatious.317  In 
                                            
314 Canada (M.P.S.E.P.) v. Welch, 2006 FC 924 at para. 25 (T.D.). 
315 Thanabalasingham, supra note 138. 
316 Immigration Division Rules, SOR/2002-229, r. 11(3). 
317 See e.g. Canada (M.P.S.E.P.) v. Liew, 2008 FC 1114 (T.D.); Iamkhong, supra 
note 9. 
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Thanabalasingham,318 the Federal Court of Appeal considered the nature of 
the Immigration Division’s detention reviews under sections 57 and 58 of the 
Act.  It noted that the Act does not draw any distinction between the first and 
subsequent detention reviews.  Therefore, the same factors may be considered 
during the first as well as all subsequent detention reviews.  Also, the Federal 
Court of Appeal observed that the Act does not impose a requirement to 
adduce any new evidence at a subsequent detention review hearing on the 
Minister.  Hence, the Member must decide afresh whether continued 
detention is warranted.  
 In that case, the Federal Court of Appeal made an interesting 
determination with respect to the weight the Immigration Division must give 
to previous detention review decisions in subsequent reviews. 
Credibility of the individual concerned and of witnesses is 
often an issue. Where a prior decision maker had the 
opportunity to hear from witnesses, observe their demeanor 
and assess their credibility, the subsequent decision maker 
must give a clear explanation of why the prior decision 
maker's assessment of the evidence does not justify 
continued detention. For example, the admission of 
relevant new evidence would be a valid basis for departing 
from a prior decision to detain. Alternatively, a 
reassessment of the prior evidence based on new arguments 
may also be sufficient reason to depart from a prior 
decision.  
The best way for the Member to provide clear and 
compelling reasons would be to expressly explain what has 
given rise to the changed opinion, i.e. explaining what the 
former decision stated and why the current Member 
disagrees.  
However, even if the Member does not explicitly state why 
he or she has come to a different conclusion than the 
previous Member, his or her reasons for doing so may be 
implicit in the subsequent decision. What would be 
                                            
318Thanabalasingham, supra note 138. 
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unacceptable would be a cursory decision which does not 
advert to the prior reasons for detention in any meaningful 
way.319  
 This precedent stands for the proposition that, before departing from 
a decision reached at a previous detention review hearing, the Immigration 
Division must clearly explain the reasons for doing so.  Furthermore, the 
Board errs when it releases a person despite reaching the conclusion that he is 
a flight risk or a danger for Canadians.  This error raises a serious issue on a 
motion for a stay of removal.320  The Board also errs when it orders a 
person’s release on the basis of the best interests of a child because this 
factor alone cannot override all other factors enumerated in the 
Regulations.321  Similarly, the Board’s failure to sufficiently examine the 
character of the bondspersons, or the relationship of the bondspersons to the 
person detained, raises a serious issue and constitutes an error.322  However, 
the Immigration Division is not required to allow for cross-examination of a 
bondsperson in all cases,323 in particular, in cases where the Minister’s 
representative requests an opportunity to cross-examine the bondspersons 
after the adjudicator renders his decision.324   
2. ESTABLISHING IRREPARABLE HARM 
 In this part, we will consider the second prong of the tri-partite test 
that the applicant must satisfy in order to obtain a stay.  In American 
Cyanamid Co. v. Ethicon Ltd., [1975] A.C. 396, the House of Lords decided 
                                            
319 Thanabalasingham, supra note 138. 
320 Ambrose, supra note 9; Canada (M.C.I.) v. Singh, 2001 FCT 954 (T.D.). 
321 Canada (M.C.I.) v. Shote, 2004 FC 115, 245 F.T.R. 32 (T.D.). 
322 Canada (M.C.I.) v. Zhang, 2001 FCT 522, 205 F.T.R. 91, [2001] 4 F.C. 173 
(T.D.) [Zhang]; Iamkhong, supra note 9. 
323 Canada (M.C.I.) v. Ke, 188 F.T.R. 91, 2000 CanLII 15184 at para. 7 (T.D.). 
324 Zhang, supra note 321. 
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that irreparable harm should not be harm that can be compensated monetarily.  
The Supreme Court of Canada followed this reasoning in the Metropolitan 
Stores325 and RJR Macdonald326 cases.  In an immigration context, this fast 
rule is not easily transposable.  As the Federal Court explained in Suresh, the 
House of Lords (or the Supreme Court) did not give any consideration to its 
applicability in the context of human rights. It is only in a commercial 
context that any court would characterize irreparable harm in terms of that 
which cannot be compensated monetarily.  The Federal Court of Appeal 
rightly pointed out that no transgression of a basic human right can be 
accurately measured or compensated by money. This is particularly true in 
immigration cases often involving deportation of individuals to a country of 
alleged persecution.327  In RJR MacDonald, the Supreme Court also 
acknowledged that “the assessment of irreparable harm in interlocutory 
applications involving Charter rights is a task which will often be more 
difficult than a comparable assessment in a private law application.  One 
reason for this is that the notion of irreparable harm is closely tied to the 
remedy of damages, but damages are not the primary remedy in Charter 
cases.”328 
 What constitutes irreparable harm in the context of stays of removal?  
In Kerrutt,329 the Federal Court concluded that, for the purposes of a stay 
motion, irreparable harm implies the serious likelihood of jeopardy to an 
applicant’s life or safety.  It added that it “is a very strict test and [...] it must 
be very grave and more than the unfortunate hardship associated with the 
                                            
325 Metropolitan Stores, supra note 3. 
326 RJR-MacDonald, supra note 192. 
327 Suresh v. M.C.I, [1999] 4 F.C. 206, [1999] F.C.J. No. 1180 (F.C.A.), rev’d 2002 
SCC 1, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.). 
328 RJR-MacDonald, supra note 192. 
329 Kerrutt v. M.E.I. (1992), 53 F.T.R. 93 (T.D.). 
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breakup or relocation of a family.”  In a more recent decision, Melo,330 the 
Federal Court adopted this reasoning and defined “irreparable harm” as 
“prejudice beyond that which is inherent in the notion of deportation itself. 
To be deported is to lose your job, to be separated from familiar places and 
people. It is accompanied by enforced separation and heartbreak”. In 
addition, a determination of irreparable harm cannot result from the same 
allegations of risk that were found not credible by the Immigration and 
Refugee Board or by the PRRA officer.  Were that the case, a stay motion 
would become a proceeding where one can collaterally challenge adverse 
credibility findings reached by the IRB and the PRRA officer.  Such is not 
the role of a stay motion; thus, the Federal Court rightly refuses to consider 
allegations of risk that were found not credible as irreparable harm: 
[...] the Court notes that the risk to the applicants upon 
their return to Turkey has been assessed twice - once by 
the Refugee Division, and a second time by the PRRA 
officer. Both administrative tribunals made findings of 
fact that the applicants would not be at risk. In the case at 
bar, the Refugee Division clearly called into question the 
applicants' credibility as it found, based on the applicants' 
behavior over a prolonged period, that they lacked the 
subjective fear of persecution that was the very basis of 
their claim. This Court has held that where an applicant's 
account was found not to be credible by the Refugee 
Division, this account cannot serve as a basis for an 
argument supporting irreparable harm in a stay 
application.331 
                                            
330 Melo, supra note 78. 
331 Akyol v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2003 FC 931 (T.D.) [Akyol]; Majerbi v. Canada 
(Solicitor General), 2008 FC 958 (T.D.); Petrovych v. Canada (M.P.S.E.P.), 2009 
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 Furthermore, irreparable harm cannot be speculative nor can it be 
based on a series of possibilities.332   
a) Harm to the Applicant Personally 
 In several decisions, the Federal Court concluded that irreparable 
harm must be assessed in connection with the person to be removed from 
Canada and not a third party, including a spouse or parents.333 In our view, 
such a restrictive interpretation of the phrase irreparable harm is simply 
illogical.  The Courts expect the removals officer to take into account the 
short-term interests of a child before refusing to defer a parent’s removal. In 
doing so, the Courts recognize that a parent’s removal may adversely affect a 
child.  Why then would the Federal Court expect a removals officer to 
consider the best interests of a child in determining the timing of the parent’s 
removal if the harm suffered by the child cannot qualify as irreparable harm 
in a motion for a stay of the parent’s removal? 
 This said, we also disagree with the contrary position which states 
that irreparable harm may be suffered by anyone.  Harm suffered by the 
extended family, friends and colleagues cannot constitute irreparable harm.  
This was the position adopted in the Federal Court’s decision in 
Jesudhasmanohararaj,334 where it was held that irreparable harm can arise 
where the children [and spouse] of the applicant will be directly and severely 
affected.  However, the Court did not agree that it could extend to third 
parties such as extended family members.  
                                            
332 Jaballah v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2006 FCA 179 at para. 4 (F.C.A.); Akyol, ibid. at 
para. 7. 
333 Bayemi v. Canada (M.C.I.), 23 March 2004, IMM-2348-04, Pinard J. (T.D.); 
Simpson v. Canada (M.E.I.), [1993] F.C.J. No. 380 (T.D.); Kante v. Canada 
(M.P.S.E.P.), 2007 FC 109 (T.D.) [Kante]; Tajram v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2006 FC 
760, [2006] F.C.J. No. 949 (T.D.). 
334 Jesudhasmanohararaj v. Canada (Solicitor General), 2004 FC 596; see also 
Melo, supra note 78, at para. 19. 
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 In many cases, irreparable harm was found to exist when the person 
affected was not the applicant himself;335 therefore, in our opinion, it can no 
longer be argued that the harm must be suffered by the applicant himself. 
b) Purely Economic Harm or Loss of Employment 
 A loss of a business in Canada caused by the applicant’s removal 
does not constitute irreparable harm336 unless this loss will adversely affect 
his family and employees.337  Similarly, a loss of a property338 and 
employment339 caused by the applicant’s removal does not constitute 
irreparable harm. 
c) Family Separation 
 In two cases decided in 2004, the Federal Court of Appeal held that 
the loss of job and separation from one’s family constitute the usual 
consequences of deportation and are not an irreparable harm “of the type 
contemplated by the three-stage test for granting a stay” either individually 
or combined.340 However, in 2005, the Federal Court of Appeal conceded that 
irreparable harm may include family separation, and is not limited to a threat 
                                            
335 See e.g.: Natoo v. Canada (M.P.S.E.P.), 2007 FC 402, 311 F.T.R. 234 (T.D.) 
[Natoo]; Phillip v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2004 FC 906 (T.D.) [Phillip]; Martinez v. 
Canada (M.C.I.), 2003 FC 1341, [2003] F.C.J. No. 1695 (T.D.) [Martinez]; Samuels 
v. Canada (M. C.I.), 2003 FC 1349 (T.D.) [Samuels]; Kahn v. Canada (M.P.S.E.P.), 
[2005] F.C.J. No. 1365 (T.D.) [Kahn]. 
336 Startchev v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2002 FCT 690 (T.D.); Akyol, supra note 330. 
337 Toth, supra note 4; Natoo, supra note 334. 
338 Benedict v. Canada (Solicitor General), 2004 FC 555 (T.D.); Camara v. Canada 
(M.P.S.E.P.), 2008 FC 1089 (T.D.); Kante, supra note 332 at para. 57. 
339 Soosaipillai v. Canada (Solicitor General), 2004 FC 684 (T.D.); Hamid v. 
Canada (M.P.S.E.P.), 2006 FC 233 at para. 4 (T.D.); David v. Canada (M.C.I), 
2006 FC 1486, 154 A.C.W.S. (3d) 437 (T.D.); Camara, ibid.; Kante supra note 332 
at para. 57. 
340 Atwal v. Canada (M.C.I.) (2004), 330 N.R. 300 (F.C.A.) [Atwal]; Selliah v. 
Canada (M.C.I.), 2004 FCA 261 (F.C.A.) [Selliah]. 
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to the deportee's life and limb.341   The Court of Appeal also acknowledged 
that decisions on the grant of stays tend to be very fact-specific; therefore, 
the difficulty is to delineate the circumstances in which family separation, or 
the disruption of personal and other important relationships, constitutes 
irreparable harm.  Thus, in deciding whether family disruption constitutes 
irreparable harm, the Court must determine whether the hardship of removal 
is a usual consequence of deportation or whether the hardship will exceed the 
usual consequences of deportation.342  For instance, a removal which results 
in financial hardship for a family in Canada would generally exceed the 
normal consequences of deportation.  In my view, the financial hardship the 
family will likely experience as a result of the applicant’s deportation may 
constitute irreparable harm.  Yet, in many decisions the Federal Court 
decided the exact opposite: the economic hardship the applicant’s family 
might experience as a result of his removal does not constitute irreparable 
harm.343  I do not argue that any financial hardship would meet the irreparable 
harm threshold; in my opinion, the financial hardship must be significant. 
d) Disruption of Medical Treatment 
 An irreparable harm will be established in cases where the applicant’s 
deportation would disrupt the medical treatment he receives in Canada.344  
For instance, a diabetic who takes expensive prescription drugs to control her 
diabetes would suffer irreparable harm if deported to a country where she 
wouldn’t be able to afford them.345 Similarly, an applicant would suffer an 
                                            
341 Tesoro v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2005 FCA 148 (F.C.A.) [Tesoro]. 
342 Ibid.; Atwal, supra note 339; Selliah, supra note 339. 
343 Phillip, supra note 334; Natoo, supra note 334; Martinez, supra note 334; 
Samuels, supra note 334; Kahn, supra note 334. 
344 Adao v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2003 FC 1396 (T.D.); Caruth, supra note 294. 
345 Gallardo v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2006 FC 1331, 302 F.T.R. 252, 58 Imm. L.R. (3d) 
238, 152, 2006 CarswellNat 3607 (T.D.).  
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irreparable harm if his removal would put an end to physiotherapy prescribed 
for a physical injury.346  Or perhaps it could be found that an applicant would 
suffer an irreparable harm if he is removed from Canada despite evidence that 
a follow up is necessary in order to determine whether further surgeries will 
be needed.347 Irreparable harm may also be established where a Canadian 
psychiatrist confirms that further investigation into the applicant’s mental 
health is required.348 An applicant who suffers from chronic renal failure and 
continues to receive dialysis treatment for her condition three times a week 
for three and a half hours each visit will no doubt suffer an irreparable harm 
if removed to her country of origin.349  An applicant who will be deprived of 
his treatment for hepatitis "C" will also meet the irreparable harm criterion.350 
An irreparable harm is likely to exist in cases where a child’s medical 
treatment will be jeopardized by the removal.351 
 However, if the medical treatment is available and accessible in the 
country of destination, there will be no irreparable harm found,352 unless the 
                                            
346 Ebonka v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2008 FC 879, [2008] F.C.J. No. 1098, 74 Imm. L.R. 
(3d) 40, 2008 CarswellNat 2500 (T.D.). 
347 Charlton v. Canada (M.P.S.E.P.), 2008 FC 1355, [2008] F.C.J. No. 1724, 78 
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applicant can prove that she would not be able to afford this treatment.353 
There will be no irreparable harm if the applicant completed his medical 
treatment and is only currently being monitored in Canada.354 
e) Application for Judicial Review in Process 
 The Federal Court and the Federal Court of Appeal often dismiss 
stays where there are outstanding applications for leave and for judicial 
review or appeals, including appeals of negative PRRA applications.355  
However, in Solis Perez, the Federal Court of Appeal recently ruled that a 
judicial review application challenging a PRRA decision becomes moot as 
soon as the person leaves the country.   In reaction to this case, two schools 
of thought seemed to emerge.  According to the first school, irreparable harm 
exists if there is a risk that the removal of a person will render moot his 
judicial review application challenging a PRRA decision.356  According to the 
second school of thought, even if the removal does render nugatory the 
application for judicial review challenging the PRRA decision, this does not 
necessarily constitute irreparable harm.357 We agree with the second school of 
thought because not every application for leave and for judicial review has 
merit.  The applicant should not be allowed to benefit from a futile judicial 
review application.  However, the Court hearing the stay motion should 
minimally conduct a cursory analysis of the PRRA decision in order to 
ascertain that it is not filled with legal and factual errors.  In other words, 
                                            
353 Singh v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2005 FC 909 (T.D.); Ebonka v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2008 
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Solis Perez implicitly requires the Court examining a stay motion to pay 
closer attention to the serious issue when the underlying decision is a judicial 
review of a PRRA decision. 
f) School Year 
 As a rule, removing a child from Canada in the middle of the school 
year does not constitute irreparable harm: 
[…] leaving school before the completion of the school 
year will no doubt be highly inconvenient and will most 
likely necessitate the redoing of their school year. 
However, this does not constitute irreparable harm.358  
 However, in certain circumstances, it may establish irreparable harm: 
As for the effect of removal on MacKenzie, his situation 
must be viewed in the context of the facts of this case. 
Loss of a school year may in some circumstance establish 
irreparable harm. That is not the case here where 
MacKenzie started junior kindergarten in September, and 
the only evidence is that he loves his school, his teachers, 
and the other students and is doing well.359 
 The circumstances which will determine whether the harm is 
irreparable are the timing of the removal, the age of the child and the type of 
studies.  For instance, if the removal takes place one month before the end of 
the school year, the child will have to redo the year in the country of 
                                            
358 Mahadeo c. Canada (M.C.I.) 166 F.T.R. 315, [1999] F.C.J. No. 294, 86 
A.C.W.S. (3d) 773 at para. 6 (T.D.); see also Strachan v. Canada (M.C.I.) (1998), 
157 F.T.R. 267, 84 A.C.W.S. (3d) 545 at para. 24 (T.D.); Nedelkovski v. Canada 
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destination.360  Consequently, removing him one month before the end of the 
school year is likely to constitute irreparable harm: 
I am satisfied that should the applicant be removed to 
Grenada on May 24, 2001, irreparable harm will be 
suffered by her elder child who, while she is not subject to 
removal by the Minister, will accompany the applicant if 
the latter is now removed. With more than one month 
remaining in the current school year, the child's schooling 
will be disrupted. Whether she will lose credit for the 
school year not yet completed is uncertain, but there is no 
uncertainty that her schooling will be affected adversely. 
In the circumstances, where that risk is unnecessary, it 
would constitute irreparable harm, in my opinion. If the 
elder child is permitted to finish her school year by 
staying removal of the applicant until after June 30, 2001, 
any irreparable harm from disruption of the child's 
schooling would disappear.361   
 Similarly, the removal will be less harmful for a young child who just 
began school as opposed to a teenager who is on the verge of graduating and 
obtaining a diploma.362 
3. BALANCE OF INCONVENIENCES 
 The third and last criterion of the tri-partite test is the balance of 
inconveniences.  This prong of the test is the least important and will in most 
cases not be decisive in immigration matters.  When assessing the 
inconveniences, the Court must determine which party will experience greater 
inconveniences if the motion is granted or dismissed. The individual’s 
                                            
360 See e.g. John v. Canada (M.C.I.), 1 June 1999, Imm-2259-99, Richard J., 1999 
CanLII 8246 (T.D.). 
361 Commissiong v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2001 FCT 539 (T.D.); Ivanov v. Canada 
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inconveniences will have likely been mentioned under the irreparable harm 
factor.  However, the sources of the Crown’s inconveniences are not as 
palpable.  They are the public interest, the security of Canadians, the integrity 
of the system and the Crown’s obligation to execute the removal orders as 
soon as reasonably practicable. 
 There is no longer any doubt that the public interest must be taken 
into consideration when evaluating the balance of inconveniences.363 For 
instance, the balance of inconveniences will favour the Crown in cases where 
the applicant has been determined to be a danger to the public:364  
In considering the balance of convenience, the Court must 
consider that the Applicant is a danger to the public in 
Canada. If a person is a danger to the public in Canada or 
has committed crimes against humanity, the public interest 
and the balance of convenience favours not staying removal 
from Canada. (Choubaev v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2002 FCT 
816; Grant v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2002 FCT 141.)365 
Or, where the applicant has a long and steady history of disregarding 
Canadian laws:366  
                                            
363 RJR-MacDonald, supra note 192; Blum v. Canada (M.C.I.) (1994), 90 F.T.R. 54 
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Rothstein J. (F.C.A.); Somian v. Canada (M.P.S.E.P.), 2008 FC 435 (T.D.). 
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In Townsend, Justice Marshall Rothstein, found that the 
balance favoured the Minister given the “appellant’s long 
criminal record and current costly incarceration outweigh 
the appellant’s lengthy residence in Canada”. (Tesoro v. 
Canada (M.C.I.), 2005 FCA 148; Thanabalasingham v. 
Canada (M.P.S.E.P.), 2006 FC 486).367 
 Is the opposite also true; does the balance of inconveniences favour 
an applicant who neither represents a danger for Canadians nor has a criminal 
record?  Some decisions stand for that proposition. Indeed, in a few 
decisions, the Federal Court held that the balance of inconveniences favours 
the applicant if he is not a security threat, a danger to the public and has no 
criminal record.368  However, the Federal Court of Appeal specifically dealt 
with this argument in Selliah: 
Counsel says that since the appellants have no criminal 
record, are not security concerns, and are financially 
established and socially integrated in Canada, the balance 
of convenience favours maintaining the status quo until 
their appeal is decided.  
I do not agree. They have had three negative administrative 
decisions, which have all been upheld by the Federal 
Court. It is nearly four years since they first arrived here. 
In my view, the balance of convenience does not favour 
delaying further the discharge of either their duty, as 
persons subject to an enforceable removal order, to leave 
Canada immediately, or the Minister's duty to remove them 
as soon as reasonably practicable: IRPA, subsection 48(2). 
This is not simply a question of administrative convenience, 
but implicates the integrity and fairness of, and public 
confidence in, Canada's system of immigration control.369  
                                            
367 Jama, supra note 362. 
368 Paez v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2005 FC 112, [2005] F.C.J. No. 143, 137 A.C.W.S. 
(3d) 157 (T.D.); Selliah v. Canada (M.C.I.), 2003 FCT 190 (T.D.); Hailu v. Canada 
(Solicitor General), 2004 FC 790 (T.D.). 
369 Selliah, supra note 339 at para. 21. 
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 In our view, the applicant’s good character should play a positive role 
in evaluating the balance of inconveniences prong of the test, but should not 
be decisive because, as we mentioned earlier, the Crown has a statutory 
obligation to execute removal orders as soon as reasonably practicable 
irrespective of the applicant’s good character.  The balance of inconveniences 
should generally favour an applicant who has significantly contributed to 
Canadian society and economy and whose presence in Canada for an 
additional period of time does not otherwise negatively affect the image of 
the system and the public interest in general.  The extent to which an 
applicant exhausted the administrative and judicial resources available should 
also play a role in determining on whose side the balance should weigh.  
More specifically, an applicant who has had the opportunity to claim asylum, 
to file permanent residence applications based on humanitarian and 
compassionate grounds, has benefited from a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment 
and has challenged most or all of these administrative decisions before the 
Federal Court has indeed exhausted all of the recourses available.  Therefore, 
the integrity of the system requires that he leave the country in order to allow 
the system to process efficiently and adequately claims made by genuine 
refugees in need of protection.  
CONCLUSION 
 Statutory, administrative and judicial stays of removal play an 
extremely important role in the immigration process; in most cases, it is the 
last opportunity a foreign national has to stop or delay his removal.  
Consequently such an important concept must be governed by consistency 
and foreseeability.  However many factors and circumstances make this 
concept highly uncertain and at times purely random.  For instance, the 
urgency and the limited time that both the parties and the Court dispose of 
when dealing with stays make it practically impossible to ensure that the law 
of stays is coherent and foreseeable.  Another important factor which makes 
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the law of stays inconsistent is the subjective approach adopted by judges 
hearing stay motions. Normally, courts strive to attain consistency in the case 
law because the doctrines of stare decisis and judicial comity require them to 
do so.  Considering the impact a deportation may have on an individual and 
considering the fact-driven nature of the immigration files, judges often bring 
their subjective and personal dimension to the decision-making process.  
Consequently, the outcome depends on the sensitivity and the values of the 
judge hearing the motion.  This may be one of the reasons why the name of 
the presiding judge on motions is not disclosed until the day of the hearing 
whereas the identity of the judge hearing judicial review applications can be 
known two weeks prior to the hearing date. 
 By introducing a few legislative amendments it would be possible to 
attenuate or mitigate some of the factors which make the law of stays 
somewhat unforeseeable.  First, the legislator should acknowledge that a stay 
motion in immigration matters has particularities that do not exist in other 
areas of law falling under the jurisdiction of the Federal Courts. Needless to 
say, the most important distinction is the impact a stay motion in immigration 
matters has on a person’s life.  In immigration files, the Federal Courts’ 
judges often hesitate to dismiss stay motions only because the applicant’s 
motion record has gaps and deficiencies.  In any other area of law, when a 
party fails to put his best foot forward, the Courts do not hesitate to dismiss 
the motion.  Many judges tolerate deficiencies because they realize that 
parties have little time to prepare their records and gather all of the relevant 
evidence.  Yet, the question that comes to mind is what can be done to rectify 
this problem.  Our recommendation is to create a separate regime for stay 
motions in immigration matters by adding several provisions to the 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act370 and to the Federal Courts 
                                            
370 Supra note 5. 
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Immigration and Refugee Protection Rules.371 A new provision is required in 
the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act obliging the immigration 
authorities to give at least four-week’s notice to deportees who are not 
detained.372  At the same time, the Federal Courts Immigration and Refugee 
Protection Rules should also be amended so that stay motions in immigration 
matters are governed entirely by these rules rather than by the Federal Courts 
Rules, which cannot fully and adequately govern stays in the context of 
immigration law because the Federal Courts Rules do not take into account 
two important realities of the immigration law: the impact of stay motions in 
a person’s life; and the application for leave that is required only in 
immigration cases.   
 Our recommendation is to add in the Federal Courts Immigration and 
Refugee Protection Rules provisions requiring that the Applicant file his 
Motion Record two weeks before the hearing date and that the Respondent 
file his Record one week before the hearing date.  This would allow both 
parties to prepare adequately, to gather and file all relevant evidence.  
Similarly, this would allow the Court sufficient time to carefully review the 
evidence, to conduct research and to adjudicate.  With these amendments, 
applicants would no longer have an excuse to file late or last-minute motions. 
Also, the Courts would no longer feel obliged to be lenient with applicants 
who choose not to put their best foot forward and whose motion record 
contains deficiencies that would otherwise be detrimental to their case.   
 In addition, while creating a separate regime for immigration-related 
stay motions under the Federal Courts Immigration and Refugee Protection 
Rules, the legislator can seize the opportunity and specify whether cross-
                                            
371 SOR/93-22. 
372 Those who are detained should also be entitled to a notice of at least one week. 
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examinations on affidavit are allowed when a stay motion is filed before 
leave is granted.   
 Another important problem relating to stay motions needs to be 
addressed by the legislator.  When the Minister is the moving party, he is 
often required to prepare a Motion Record within a few hours because the 
Immigration Division’s Order to release a foreign national from detention 
becomes effective immediately.  The author of this paper was faced with a 
situation where he was required to prepare a Record within 45 minutes in 
order to avoid the release of a person who was, in the Minister’s opinion, a 
danger for Canadians and a flight risk.  It is difficult to describe how quickly 
one needs to think, draft and delegate in order to produce a Motion Record 
within 45 minutes. 
 The legislator should amend rule 11(3) of the Immigration Division 
Rules373 which states that the Immigration Division’s release order is 
effective immediately.  The release order should become effective 24 hours 
after it is rendered so that counsel for the Minister can prepare the Motion 
Record within a relatively reasonable amount of time.  Under the current 
legislation, counsel for the respondent must file an interim stay motion or 
send a letter requesting that the Court order a stay of the person’s release 
until the Minister can file his record and plead his case.  Theoretically, 
neither of these two ways of proceeding is fully legitimate because the 
Minister asks the Court to stay a person’s release for a short period of time 
without any evidence.  However, counsel for the Minister can proceed in no 
other way to prevent the release of the foreign national while preparing the 
Motion Record. 
 Despite our ambitions, we were unable to cover all aspects of stay 
applications.  We did not touch on appeals against decisions of the Federal 
                                            
373 Supra note 13. 
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Courts’ Trial Division on a stay motion. For instance, what constitutes an 
excess of jurisdiction and a refusal to exercise jurisdiction?   
 Also, we did not discuss the interrelation that exists between 
statutory and judicial stays.  More specifically, when immigration authorities 
fail to apply a statutory stay, does the applicant need to establish irreparable 
harm when he challenges this decision and files a motion for a (judicial) stay 
of removal?  Statutory stays do not require that irreparable harm exist; thus, 
if an applicant raises a serious issue with respect to the application of a 
statutory stay, one can argue that he no longer needs to establish the 
irreparable harm criterion. 
 Similarly, when an applicant challenges several administrative 
decisions and files several stay motions at different times, does it amount to 
an abuse of process?   
 Because of its importance on human rights, this subject deserves 
further research and we hope this paper will incite the interest of the legal 
and academic community.   
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